Chapter 28

Intergroup Relations

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The primary elections that set the stage for the 2008 U.S. presidential elections constituted a "*première*" in American history. Traditionally, party delegates end up choosing among "mainstream" European American male candidates. This time, the votes from the members of the Democratic Party were split between a woman, Sen. Hillary Clinton, and an African American man, Sen. Barack Obama, both representatives of minority groups in North American society, whether in power, in numbers, or both. Some 40 years after the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. and a little more than a century after the demonstrations of the Suffragettes, relations between the dominant group of European American men and other groups that comprise U.S. society seem to have evolved, permitting events that were simply unimaginable a few decades earlier. As is well known, Sen. Obama eventually won the election over Sen. John McCain, becoming the first minority president in American history. This is but one example of a series of encouraging signs regarding the nature of the relations between groups in general, and minorities and majorities in particular. In addition to other prominent examples of minority members achieving stature and power, such as Kofi Annan as head of the United Nations (U.N.) or Angela Merkel as Chancellor of Germany, perhaps the most convincing piece of data concerns the steady improvement of indicators documenting sex and ethnic inequalities in United Nations statistics.

Not all relations between groups, however, follow this reassuring path. Around the world, examples abound of the difficult, at times ferocious, relations between human groups. The message here, however, should not be that some countries are bad, whereas others are on a decidedly good path. During the latest presidential elections in the United States, several states ended up passing anti-gay laws. Surveys reveal that some Obama voters also contributed to restricting the civil rights of homosexuals. Obviously, the picture is a complex one, and oftentimes good news hides less cheering realities.

The groups taken into consideration in intergroup relations research are quite diverse (Lickel et al., 2000; for a collection, see Brown & Gaertner, 2001). Whenever scholars examine social entities, be they small (e.g., classes, sports teams), large (neighborhoods, universities, companies), or even very large (women, African Americans, Christians), they speak of intergroup research. In addition, researchers tackle intergroup issues using a variety of approaches. For instance, although they devoted most of their good work to examine interactions between various social entities, they also paid attention to intragroup processes. But intergroup research does not only involve groups as the unit of observation. In fact, the bulk of contemporary work concerns individual responses (Fiske & Taylor, 2008). Every time individuals react in a way that is influenced by their own or their partner's group membership, it falls under the umbrella of research on intergroup relations. Interactions between groups and between members of various groups take many forms. Researchers' best efforts deal with troublemakers, disputes, clashes, and conflicts. But groups may also choose to ignore each other and live in what appear to be segregated and separate worlds. Finally, at the other end of the continuum, groups and their members also engage in peaceful and harmonious interactions or even cooperate with other groups. It is not unusual to see different groups join forces and work together to alter situations that are detrimental to one or several of them.

This chapter deals with the recent literature on the various factors that shape intergroup relations, as well as with their results and consequences. Beyond this review, several other contributions, such as the ones on social conflict (De Dreu, this volume), on intergroup bias (Dovidio & Gartner, this volume), on power structures (Fiske, this volume), and on implicit measures (Banaji & Heiphetz, volume 1), also deal, either directly or indirectly, with aspects of intergroup relations. After having been a subsidiary issue in early editions of this *Handbook*, intergroup relations has established itself as a major topic of research in the two most recent editions, one that can be approached from a variety of angles.

The importance of intergroup relations, as a topic on researchers' agendas, is hardly surprising. People live and act in a world of groups. The way individuals think about the world, how they feel, and how they behave—indeed, all behavior—is guided and sometimes constrained by the group(s) to which they belong. Social psychologists have come to agree that a limited number of distal structural factors characterize the relations between the various groups that compose a given social system (Fiske, Xu, Cuddy, & Glick, 1999). At the same time, a tenet of the discipline is that these factors influence behavior only insofar as they affect people's perception of the situation (Lewin, 1948). A first key determinant of the interactions between members of various groups and between groups themselves is the malevolent versus benevolent nature of their relations, resulting, in part, from the objective state of affairs in terms of available material and symbolic resources, and also, from the subjective interpretation of the situation by perceivers. Although this chapter focuses quite a bit on conflictual and otherwise competitive relations, it also looks at more complex relations in which the ascription of positive qualities to the group may sometimes lead to negative emotional or behavioral reactions.

A second structural factor that shapes intergroup relations and determines the phenomenology of group members is the relative standing of the groups in the social structure—that is, whether a specific group is in a dominant position or, in contrast, occupies a subordinate position. This is why, beyond a series of invariants that affect group members in most if not all situations, various issues also need to be examined in light of the specific vantage point (i.e., dominant vs. dominated) of the group. Each subsection of this chapter will initially stress a series of issues that are common to all groups and group members before turning to specific aspects resulting from the dominant versus subordinate position of the group.

This chapter comprises five major sections. The first section, Theories of Group Attachment, reviews theories that account for the special relationship between individuals and the group(s) to which they belong. This section focuses on evolutionary and social psychological theories that build on basic needs, such as the need to belong and the need to control, or on other motivational or cognitive processes (such as social identity and self-categorization theories). Appraisals of Intergroup Relations, From Prejudice to Emotions, and Intergroup Behaviors assess the classic and more recent work on the three aspects that characterize people's reactions in intergroup contexts, namely, their beliefs and representations (i.e., stereotypes), their feelings and emotions (i.e., prejudice), and their behavioral intentions, as well as their behaviors (i.e., discrimination). Finally, Challenges and Promises deals with a number of challenges and new issues that emerged since the late 1990s and proposes a series of directions for future research.

This chapter focuses on the fabric of intergroup relations. The main ambition is to clarify the role played by representations, emotions, and behaviors insofar as they set the stage for fruitful or conflictual interactions between groups or their members. This chapter thus is not concerned with the abundant and fascinating research regarding the factors that may improve intergroup relations and reduce conflict. The task of examining the strategies that may reduce intergroup disagreements or clashes is left to the intergroup bias chapter (Dovidio & Gaertner, this volume). Both chapters should be seen as complementary and allow readers, when read in combination, to gain a fuller sense of what researchers accomplished in the domain of intergroup relations.

THEORIES OF GROUP ATTACHMENT

Broadly speaking, theories of group attachment address two questions: "why" people feel attached to their group and "how" this attachment unfolds (see also the chapter on belonging, attraction, and affiliation, Leary, this volume). The "why" question tackles the issue of group identification and speaks to the role that groups occupy in people's lives. In this perspective, groups are tools or instruments for the fulfillment of individual (or collective) needs and goals. The individual is a given, and the focus is on those cognitive and motivational processes that lead to the formation, existence, and persistence of social groups. Other theories of group attachment concentrate on the "how" question. They reverse the individual-to-group path and take membership in social groups as their point of departure to examine the consequences of such membership for individuals' behavior.

Group Attachment: From Individual and Collective Needs to Group Formation

In his five-stage hierarchy of human needs, Maslow (1943) placed the need for affiliation and belongingness in-between

the primary physiological and safety needs (i.e., survival and reproduction), and linked the higher-level needs to self-development (i.e., self-esteem and self-actualization). In this conception of human motivations, people seek to overcome feelings of loneliness and alienation by providing and receiving love and affection to and from close others. Contemporary theories of group attachment depart from this proposition in substantial ways. Most, if not all, of today's dominant theories consider group affiliation and belongingness not as a motivation in itself, but rather as a means for the fulfillment of other significant individual and collective needs (Correll & Park, 2005). Put differently, groups are instrumental to individuals and mainly serve to overcome the deficiencies associated with solitary human existence. Among the functions that groups fulfill, some are more cognitive, whereas others are largely motivational.

Motivational Determinants of Attachment

Evolutionary perspectives on group attachment share the basic premise that human beings have adapted for group living (Neuberg, Kenrick, & Schaller, this volume). According to these perspectives, joining a collective has proved over the millennia to be more efficient than remaining alone to respond to humans' most basic needs, namely, survival and reproduction. Groups provide opportunities for mating and parental investment, and constitute important improvements for defense and protection against external threats. Evolutionary theorists postulate that individuals who were better adapted for group life benefited from a selection advantage that resulted in the "evolution of perceptual, affective, and cognitive processes that support the development and maintenance of membership in groups" (Caporael, 2005, p. 820). In other words, human beings face *obligatory interdependence*, and the group plays the role of a buffer between the individual and the physical environment. For these authors (Brewer, 2004; Caporael & Brewer, 1995), demands of social interdependence have shaped all aspects of human psychology.

Recent theories explaining the reasons for the surprisingly relative large size of the human brain as compared to other animals fit well with this perspective (Dunbar, 1998). Although conventional wisdom and early scientific explanations generally stressed the role of the brain in sensory or technical competence, Dunbar and Shultz (2007) suggest that it was the computational demands of living in complex societies that resulted in the adaptive selection of large brains. In other words, it is the cognitive requirements of the uniquely social life of primates, and in particular the demands of the more intense forms of pair bonding, that promoted this evolutionary development of the human brain. In a related vein, Tomasello, Carpenter, Call, Behne, and Moll (2005) argued that human cognition is fundamentally different from other primate species. Although great apes understand the basics of intentional action, a species-unique motivation exists in human beings to share emotions, experiences, and activities with other people. This *shared intentionality* might have developed out of a need to search for and dominate scarce resources in ancestral times, an activity that can more easily be dominated by small groups of individuals to the exclusion of others (Tomasello et al., 2005). Recently, Hermann, Call, Hernandez-Lloreda, Hare, and Tomasello (2007) proposed that human beings do not simply evidence more general intelligence than primate species, but that they possess greater and more sophisticated cognitive skills for dealing with the social world. They call this phenomenon the "cultural intelligence hypothesis," and it derives from humans' unique motivation to participate and exchange knowledge in cultural groups (Epley & Waytz, volume 1).

Being attuned to social life does not imply that attachment is undifferentiated. As Kurzban and Leary (2001) argued, human adaptation to sociality is specific and includes cognitive mechanisms that cause individuals to be selective both about their interaction partners and the types of interactions which they are willing to engage in with those partners. The same argument is put forward by the Need to Belong theory (Baumeister & Leary, 1995). According to this theoretical framework, individuals are innately prepared (for health, survival, and reproduction reasons) to form and to maintain at least a minimal number of interpersonal relationships involving frequent interactions and persistent caring. For social contact to be satisfactory, it should take place on a long term basis and involve intimate partners rather than strangers. Research confirms that people value intimacy groups (such as family and friendship groups), characterized by their small size and high levels of interpersonal interactions, more than task groups, social categories, or loose associations (Deaux, Reid, Mizrahi, & Ethier, 1995; Lickel et al., 2000). Such findings substantiate the fact that issues of trust and reciprocity are at stake.

A motivation for self-preservation is also at the heart of *terror management theory* (TMT; Greenberg, Solomon, & Pyszczynski, 1997; Pyszczynski, Greenberg, & Solomon, 1997; Solomon, Greenberg, & Pyszczynski, 1991, 2004). From the perspective of TMT, human beings are the only animal species that combines the natural and fundamental instinct for self-preservation with the cruel awareness of the inevitability of their own mortality. This combination creates the potential for the experience of paralyzing terror, which can undermine human functioning. To reduce the threat of the consequences of death, TMT suggests that individuals attempt to seek symbolic immortality through a dual-component death anxiety buffer. Cultural worldviews and the belief that one is living up to cultural standards (i.e., self-esteem) are the two mechanisms that are used as terror

management strategies in daily life. Not surprisingly, people devote a great deal of energy to this existential maintenance and defense (Pyszczynski et al., 1997).

In this perspective, ingroups are of critical importance because they are considered as a primary source of support for people's cultural worldviews, and they provide individuals with a kind of vicarious immortality (Castano & Dechesne, 2005; Greenberg et al., 1997). Indeed, ingroup bias is increased in the evaluations of minimal ingroups and outgroups when mortality is made salient (Harmon-Jones, Greenberg, Solomon, & Simon, 1996). Moreover, mortality salience increases both ingroup identification and perceived ingroup entitativity, and both mechanisms act as mediators for the occurrence of ingroup bias (Castano, Yzerbyt, Paladino, & Sacchi, 2002). People also seem more willing to embrace stronger group leaders under mortality salience (Landau et al., 2004).

Thus, group membership clearly serves as an insurance policy of sorts. Because groups serve humans' survival and reproductive needs, people who were better able to manage living in a group and to keep track of their social relations have likely derived some evolutionary advantage. Of course, groups also ought to deliver specific rewards if they are to trigger any attachment and identification in their members. Research confirms that people prove sensitive to cues that are indicative of group efficiency (Castano, Yzerbyt, & Bourguignon, 2003; Yzerbyt, Castano, Leyens, & Paladino, 2000) and react strongly against questionable group members (Abrams, Marques, Bown, & Henson, 2000; Leyens & Yzerbyt, 1992; Marques & Páez, 1994; Marques, Yzerbyt & Leyens, 1988). As the next subsection details, often from these (symbolic) self-preservation and efficacy concerns, groups also fulfill people's need for control and certainty.

Cognitive Determinants of Attachment

One of the most celebrated human motives is the desire for control (Skinner, 1996; Haidt & Rodin, 1999). Control is essential to human functioning because it allows for predictions about and confidence in how to behave and what to expect from the physical and social environment. Research has provided ample evidence that human beings strive to render the world a predictable and controllable place (Pittman, 1998). The more control and autonomy people enjoy, the more comfortable they feel and the better they perform. In contrast, experiencing a lack of control is aversive (Fiske & Taylor, 1991, 2008). Many theories of group attachment can be related to this desire for control motivation.

As a recent illustration, the *uncertainty management model* suggests that people have a fundamental need to feel certain about their world and their place within it, that the world is largely uncertain, and that people strive to eliminate or reduce threats to certainty (Lind & van den Bos, 2002; van den Bos & Lind, 2002). In fact, several authors have begun to question the explanation of TMT effects in terms of self-preservation motives, proposing instead that the impact of mortality salience reflects the influence of a diminished feeling of control and an increased sense of uncertainty (van den Bos, Poortvliet, Maas, Miedema, & van den Ham, 2005). In a series of experiments, Fritsche, Jonas, and Fankhänel (2008) disentangled mortality and lack of control by contrasting the mortality salience manipulation with a control anxiety treatment (i.e., dental pain) and, more importantly, with a condition in which salience of death was accompanied by controllability (suicide, i.e., a self-determined death). Suggesting the crucial role of control restoration motivations in explaining the traditional effects of mortality salience, increased worldview defense (i.e., ingroup bias, ingroup homogeneity, ingroup identification, and social consensus estimates) emerged only after traditional mortality salience manipulations but not when participants contemplated a self-determined death. Gailliot, Schmeichel, and Baumeister (2006) found similar evidence in that individuals high in self-control ability reported less death anxiety and less worldview defense strategies when mortality was made salient than did individuals who were low in self-control ability (Gailliot, Schmeichel, & Maner, 2007).

One of the early theoretical propositions that rested on the idea of control is *social comparison theory*. According to Festinger (1954), people who face an environment in which reality checks are unavailable or where there are no objective referents tend to compare their own vision of the world with that of others. Through this process of "social reality testing," people try to validate their opinions and beliefs by comparing them with social referents in their environment (Mussweiler, 2003; Stapel & Suls, 2007). Initially formulated as an interpersonal process, social comparison has also proved sensitive to social factors: only ingroup, but not outgroup, members have the ability to reduce subjective uncertainty (for a recent collection, see Guimond, 2006).

Although research has long suggested that affiliation can be a response to stress and uncertainty (Schachter, 1959), and can serve as a means for processes of self-evaluation, this proposition has only recently been linked to the issue of group attachment (Hogg & Abrams, 1993; Hogg & Mullin, 1999). Hogg's (2000) *uncertainty reduction theory* states that uncertainty motivates people to self-categorize and identify with a group to the extent that this group provides them with clear norms for structuring their beliefs and guiding their behaviors (Hogg & Mullin, 1999). Hogg and his colleagues (Hogg & Grieve, 1999; Grieve & Hogg, 1999) showed that identification with minimal groups is contingent on the existence of subjective uncertainty. However, the uncertainty reduction motivation is effective only when it touches on a domain that is subjectively important to the

individual (Hogg & Mullin, 1999). Uncertain individuals also identify with self-inclusive categories that are relevant to the contextual self-definition but much less so with irrelevant ones (Hogg & Mullin, 1999). Finally, group identification is strongest when individuals feel uncertain and the ingroup is perceived as a coherent social entity (Hogg, Sherman, Dierselhuis, Maitner, & Moffitt, 2007).

Uncertainty reduction theory blends cognitive aspects of *self-categorization theory* (SCT; Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987), which is presented later, with motivational elements (Brown & Capozza, 2006). In a similar vein, *optimal distinctiveness theory* (ODT; Brewer, 1991, 1993) combines an evolutionary perspective on social identification (Caporael, Dawes, Orbell, & van de Kragt, 1989) with cognitive aspects laid out by SCT (Turner et al., 1987). Specifically, ODT holds that identification with social groups plays an important role in the satisfaction of two fundamental yet conflicting motivations (see also Codol, 1984, 1987). On the one hand, individuals strive for assimilation, that is, the need for ingroup inclusion; on the other hand, they face a need for differentiation from others. According to ODT, the importance that a person will attach to a particular social identity (i.e., his or her willingness to become or be considered as a member of a given social group) will depend on the strength of assimilation and differentiation needs, and the perceived level of inclusiveness of the contextually salient social group (Brewer & Pickett, 2002). In two studies, Pickett, Silver, and Brewer (2002) experimentally induced the need for assimilation, the need for differentiation, or no need, and found that participants primed with a need for differentiation perceived broad social categories as less important to them than those primed with a need for assimilation. In addition, the induction of a need for differentiation (vs. assimilation) led to a stronger (vs. weaker) perception of ingroup overinclusiveness and to an underestimation (vs. overestimation) of ingroup size. Future research should confirm that differentiation and assimilation needs impact a whole range of personal and group behaviors (Hornsey & Jetten, 2004).

Finally, Johnson and colleagues (2006) investigated the different social motivational functions of intimacy, task, and social category groups. They predicted and found that people perceive intimacy groups to be associated with affiliation needs and task groups to fulfill achievement needs. The predicted perceived association between social categories and identity needs was much weaker. Although these authors concentrated their work on cognitive representations of the functionality of different types of groups rather than on their actual properties, it remains that their work points to a more differentiated view of the reasons for group attachment (see also Lickel, Rutchick, Hamilton, & Sherman, 2006).

Summary

Human beings are intrinsically social. Recent theorizing suggests that evolution favored those individuals who proved more apt to living and organizing themselves in groups, presumably because doing so afforded clear rewards in terms of survival and reproduction. Several lines of work converge to stress the key role of the aptitude for sociality in the development of the human brain. The idea of preservation, albeit in a more symbolic sense, is also central to perspectives that stress the role of humans' painful awareness of their own finitude in triggering a variety of group-favoring reactions. Whereas motivational factors hang on the group's efficacy, i.e., its ability to secure desired advantages and to be up to the challenges of the physical and social environment, people affiliate with groups for more cognitive reasons as well. Subjective feelings of control and certainty are key motives that encourage people to join together and to select certain groups over others. People will strive for membership in social entities that propose clear lines of conduct, and offer an adequate balance between a sense of uniqueness and a sense of community. Finally, specific attachment to different types of groups seems to result from the specific needs (i.e., affiliation, achievement, and identity needs) these groups are perceived to fulfill.

Group Attachment: From Group Categorization to Individual Identification

Social perceivers lack the cognitive capacity to deal with an overly complex environment (Fiske & Taylor, 2008). Categorization is the process by which individuals simplify their environment, creating categories on the basis of attributes that objects appear to have (or to not have) in common. Categorization processes apply not only to physical but also to social targets. This so-called cognitive miser perspective has generated a massive amount of research and, as discussed later in this chapter, has exerted a lasting influence in the area of stereotypes. But what is the impact of these presumably unavoidable categorization processes on an individual's attachment to social groups? Moreover, what are the contextual variables that may drive people to define themselves at a given hierarchical level in the categorical structure? These questions are at the heart of two of the most prominent social psychological models of the last 50 years: social identity theory and SCT.

Social Identity Theory and Self-Categorization Theory

In 1971, Tajfel, Billig, Bundy, and Flament created what is known as the *minimal group paradigm*. In their experiments, these authors attempted to assess the impact of social

categorization on intergroup behavior in a situation in which individual self-interest and prior attitudes were neither present nor relevant. To do so, they used an arbitrary criterion to randomly divide participants into two groups. Their results and many others afterward (for reviews, see Brown, 2000; Messick & Mackie, 1989; and Mullen, Brown, & Smith, 1992) demonstrated that, under most conditions, mere categorization is sufficient to produce discriminatory intergroup behaviors in the form of ingroup favoritism but not outgroup derogation (Brewer, 1979, 1993).

To explain these surprising results, Tajfel and Turner (1979; Tajfel, 1972; Turner, 1975) developed the *social identity theory* (SIT), according to which categorization of people into social groups grants them a social identity. Social identity is that aspect of a person's self-concept that derives from the person's membership in a group. Once people define and evaluate themselves in terms of their social identity, Tajfel (1979) argued, a social comparison process is triggered in which individuals start to compare their ingroup with relevant outgroups in the social environment. This social comparison process, combined with an intrinsic motivation to perceive one's social self in a positive light, causes positive intergroup differentiation and ingroup biases. Thus, an individual's behavior greatly depends on the extent to which that individual's self-concept is defined in terms of personal versus group characteristics. Tajfel (1974) relied on this so-called interpersonal-intergroup continuum to explain changes in behavioral patterns as a function of a person's self-definition.

Motivation for a positive social identity alone, however, does not determine intergroup behaviors. For Tajfel and Turner (1979), intergroup attitudes and behaviors depend on both the strength of social identification with the group and the social structure of intergroup relationships. According to SIT, three main characteristics of the social structure combine with social identity to determine the behavioral direction taken by the categorized individual: the perceived legitimacy of the structure, the stability of the structure, and the permeability of group boundaries (Ellemers, 1993; Ellemers, Spears, & Doosje, 1999, 2002; Ellemers, van Knippenberg, de Vries, & Wilke, 1988). Depending on whether group members perceive status relationships as secure or insecure and intergroup boundaries as permeable or impermeable, they will adopt different types of strategies to achieve a positive social identity. The section on Appraisals of Intergroup Relations examines the role of the intergroup structure in more detail. Last but not least, SIT postulates that, to the extent that people define their self-concept in terms of the group to which they belong, all value connotations and emotional experiences associated with the group become associated with the individuals themselves. The section From Prejudice to Emotions returns to this issue.

Reconceptualizing Tajfel's (1974) proposition of an interpersonal-intergroup continuum where personal and social identity are considered as the two poles of the spectrum, Turner and his colleagues (Turner, 1985, 1987; Turner et al., 1987; Turner & Oakes, 1989) proposed that personal and social identity represent the categorization of the self at different levels of inclusiveness. Building on Rosch's (1978) work on categorical inclusiveness and exemplar prototypicality, SCT postulates that the self can be categorized at different levels of abstraction. It is the context that determines which inclusive level is most salient at any particular moment. Contextual factors that influence the salience of a specific self-categorization are category accessibility, perceived match between the category and the current environment, and strength of a person's social identification with the category—that is, the extent to which the category is central and valued by the individual (Doosje & Ellemers, 1997). The metacontrast principle, another idea found in Rosch's work, further suggests that social categorization will occur to the extent that perceived differences between members of one's own group and members of the other group are greater than the perception of differences within the ingroup.

SCT deviates from SIT in a number of ways. Regarding their specific focus, Otten and Epstude (2006) note, "Whereas SIT especially tries to understand the emergence of ingroup favoritism, SCT more generally addresses the conditions and consequences when people define themselves in terms of their group membership" (p. 957). Also, motivational processes are at the heart of SIT, whereas SCT centers its analysis on the cognitive elements of social categorization. According to SCT, the self-concept is a cognitive representation of the self that is contextually dependent and thus variant. Although this idea contrasts with early versions of *self-schema theory* (Markus, 1977; Markus & Sentis, 1982), which postulate that representations of the self are stable schemas that facilitate information processing (for a thorough discussion, see Onorato & Tuner, 2004), a great deal of overlap exists with later versions incorporating the idea of a working self-concept (Markus & Kunda, 1986; Markus & Nurius, 1986; Markus & Wurf, 1987).

For SCT, categorization of the self at the social level will lead to depersonalization and self-stereotyping. In addition, the definition of oneself at the social level accentuates intragroup similarities (i.e., assimilation) and intergroup differences (i.e., contrast), as is the case with all other systems of categorization. The self is perceived as an interchangeable representative of the shared social category. This leads individuals to attach less importance to their unique personal characteristics (depersonalization), and to experience themselves and behave according to their prototypical representation of the category (self-stereotyping).

As such, self-categorization is the "cognitive mechanism which makes group behavior possible" (Turner, 1984, p. 527).

Elaborations and Criticisms of Social Identity Theory and Self-Categorization Theory

SIT and SCT have generated hundreds of studies that show strong empirical support for their theoretical propositions (for reviews, see Brown, 2000; Ellemers, Spears, & Doosje, 2002). However, both theories have also received a fair amount of qualification and criticism. As mentioned earlier, intergroup differentiation in minimal intergroup situations is better understood as a bias toward ingroup favoritism rather than outgroup derogation (Brewer, 1979; Hewstone, Rubin, & Willis, 2002). Research by Mummendey and colleagues (Blanz, Mummendey, & Otten, 1995; Mummendey & Otten, 1998; Mummendey, Otten, Berger, & Kessler, 2000; Otten, Mummendey, & Blanz, 1996) demonstrated the importance of the judgment's valence in the existence of such biases. Specifically, mere categorization in minimal intergroup contexts seems insufficient to induce preferential treatment of one's own group and discrimination against an outgroup. That is, when group members have to evaluate their ingroup and an outgroup on a positive dimension or to allocate positive resources to these groups, people favor ingroup members over outgroup members. However, when judgments are made on negative dimensions, or when people are required to punish or inflict aversive treatment, differential behaviors toward ingroup and outgroup members are not observed (Amiot & Bourhis, 2005; Buhl, 1999). For Mummendey and colleagues (2000), the absence of discrimination under negative valence conditions is a consequence of a change in the level of salience of the categorization. That is, in the negative domain, people tend to elaborate more systematically the categorical information, and this process leads them to the conclusion that the minimal group distinction, in this case, is not a legitimate basis for differentiation. Seen this way, the positive-negative asymmetry supports, rather than undermines, the propositions made by SCT because the effect of valence on intergroup discrimination is mediated by perceived category salience.

Other authors are more critical. For instance, Rabbie and colleagues (Rabbie, 1991; Rabbie & Horwitz, 1988; Rabbie, Schot, & Visser, 1989; see also Gaertner & Insko, 2000) have argued that most of the results obtained in minimal group situations simply derive from self-interest. That is, people perceive that they depend on others to achieve personal profit and, as a consequence, they are motivated to associate with these others to serve their self-interest. Interdependence is thus what drives intergroup phenomena. Turner, Bourhis, and colleagues (Bourhis, Turner, & Gagnon, 1997; Gagnon & Bourhis, 1996; Perreault & Bourhis, 1998) have extensively responded to this criticism at conceptual and empirical levels. As a matter of fact, Turner (1985) did consider that interdependence, together with many other contextual factors, can indeed be the cause of psychological group formation. However, interdependence can also be the result (rather than the cause) of shared group membership (Turner, 1999). The debate opposing the proponents of an SIT/SCT perspective versus those supporting the interdependence hypothesis is an ongoing one, and many advocate for a better assessment of the underlying assumptions of SIT/SCT. For instance, L. Gaertner and colleagues (Gaertner, Iuzzini, Guerrero Witt, & Oriña, 2006) have argued that intragroup (e.g., interaction and interdependence) rather than intergroup (e.g., intergroup comparison) processes might be at the heart of group formation and might trigger positive evaluations of the ingroup allowing for "us" to exist without "them."

Together with the idea that social groups are competing for scarce resources and that their members are guided by self-interest, the Lewinian view championed by Rabbie and others is often presented as antithetical to the Tajfelian approach in which people see themselves as category members who inherit the symbolic standing of their group. Scheepers and colleagues (Scheepers, Spears, Doosje, & Manstead, 2006) proposed to integrate rather than oppose what they call the instrumental and the identity concerns, arguing that both concerns may trigger bias in different people and different contexts (see also Correll & Park, 2005; Stroebe, Lodewijkx, & Spears, 2005). These authors appraise the identity function in terms of how ingroup bias can create, and thereafter express, a positive, distinct, and meaningful social identity. In contrast, how ingroup bias mobilizes ingroup members, raises solidarity, and motivates them to engage in competition with the outgroup all relate to the instrumental function. Clearly, the context of the minimal group paradigm favors the "creation" facet of the identity function. The "expression" facet of the identity function emerges when group relations are rather stable and members seek symbolic superiority. Not surprisingly, self-esteem constitutes the main dividend of the identity function. The situation changes when people belong to a low-status or otherwise threatened ingroup. Here, ingroup bias materializes the motivation to improve one's lot and to secure material benefits in the context of a realistic conflict. Scheepers and colleagues' work (Scheepers, Spears, Doosje, & Manstead, 2002, 2003, 2006) not only stresses the multifaceted nature of ingroup bias but also emphasizes the fact that group members act strategically in response to a complex array of contextual determinants.

Having said this, the exact role of self-esteem continues to remain under scrutiny, even among SIT supporters

(Aberson, Healy, & Romero, 2000; Hogg & Abrams, 1990; Rubin & Hewstone, 1998). Intergroup discrimination is often seen both as a consequence of low self-esteem and as a precursor of high self-esteem. Both empirical work and meta-analytic reviews suggest that, whereas discrimination is, indeed, conducive to higher levels of self-regard, high self-esteem is, perhaps paradoxically, more likely than low self-esteem to lead to differentiation. This issue is dealt with in more detail later in this chapter during the examination of the role of personality factors in the emergence of prejudice.

On a related note, Otten and colleagues (Otten & Moskowitz, 2000; Otten & Epstude, 2006; Otten & Wentura, 1999) have questioned the fundamental propositions of SIT and SCT in a line of research that is based on the *self-anchoring hypothesis* (Cadinu & Rothbart, 1996). First, these authors question the (i.e., "strive for positive social distinctiveness") motivational hypothesis as underlying ingroup favoritism in minimal group experiments. They argue that a novel ingroup directly acquires a positive value connotation because of a self-anchoring process (Gramzow & Gaertner, 2005; Otten & Wentura, 2001). Presumably, because the self is typically evaluated positively (Baumeister, 1998), novel ingroups to which the self has been assigned are evaluated positively by default. Thus, ingroup bias "might, at least partly, be based upon an automatically activated, implicit positive attitude towards the self-including social category" (Otten & Wentura, 1999, p. 1050).

Second, SCT predicts that, once individuals come to define themselves at the social level, they enter a process of depersonalization in which the self is assimilated into the social category, the ingroup. This phenomenon is called self-stereotyping and is presumed to account for the well-documented, overlapping descriptions of the self and the ingroup (Coats, Smith, Claypool, & Banner, 2000; Smith, Coats, & Walling, 1999; Smith & Henry, 1996). Otten and Epstude's research (2006), however, suggests that the overlap between the description of the self and the ingroup could also be explained as an assimilation of the ingroup to the individual self via a self-anchoring mechanism (Cadinu & Rothbart, 1996; see also Clement & Krueger's work [2000, 2002] on social projection and Gramzow, Gaertner, and Sedikides's work [2001] on the self-as-information-base model).

Summary

People grow up in the midst of a complex social world. They divide their social environment into discrete categories and find themselves in one of these groups. Distinguishing the social world into "us" and "them" entails major consequences in how individuals treat those who belong to their own group or category and those who do not. Two major empirical and theoretical perspectives, SIT and SCT, directly address this issue and continue to be major references in the field. Over the past decade, researchers celebrated the explanatory power of these approaches while pursuing the critical evaluation of their core assumptions. Following up on the useful distinction between ingroup bias and outgroup derogation, recent work on the positive-negative asymmetry stresses the importance of taking into account the valence of the dimension of differentiation. In an attempt to overcome a heated debate about the motivational foundations of ingroup bias and opposing a more "interested and motivational" (i.e., Lewinian) view of people as group members to a more "symbolic and cognitive" (i.e., Tajfelian) conception of individuals as category members, some researchers now propose an integrated view in which both instrumental and identity concerns can be reconciled. As suggested, however, the dispute between these positions remains vivid, and the field needs further research for this question to be settled. Finally, research also assessed the exact status of self-esteem. The classic view holds that people like their group because its positive properties befall on them. Instead, recent work suggests that people view their group in a positive light because they like themselves and project their positive qualities onto their group.

APPRAISALS OF INTERGROUP RELATIONS

Ever since the Ancient Greeks, philosophers and intellectuals have celebrated three distinct facets of human functioning. Among psychologists, the all-time favorite tripartite conception refers to cognition, emotion, and behavior. Within intergroup relations and stereotyping research, this division translates into stereotypes, prejudice, and discrimination (Fiske, 1998). Partly because of Allport's (1954) influential contribution, researchers long took it for granted that prejudice assumes antecedence. Borrowing from theories in the area of attitudes and in the field of emotions, the dominant view is now that appraisals influence prejudice, which, in turn, orients behavior (Mackie & Smith, 1998; Talaska, Fiske, & Chaiken, 2008). Accordingly, this section and the two following sections examine these three aspects. This section starts by examining people's representations of groups and group members, dealing with questions of process and content, before examining in more detail the way perceivers see the various groups within the social environment, and more generally, the social structure and relations between groups. The next section focuses on the emotional reactions triggered in the context of intergroup relations. The third section in this trilogy surveys a wide range of intergroup behaviors.

Group Perception

Categorization, Stereotype Activation, and Stereotype Application

One message from early research on intergroup relations was that stereotypical features could be listed for any social group (Katz & Braly, 1933), even groups that do not exist (for reviews, see Leyens, Yzerbyt, & Schadron, 1994; Schneider, 2004). Nothing seemed to constrain the specific set of traits that may characterize a group except that these qualities join together to form a stereotypical image (Lippmann, 1922). This early work also promoted the view that stereotypes show a substantial level of inertia (Gilbert, 1951; Karlins, Coffman, & Walters, 1969; Sigall & Page, 1971; but see Devine & Elliot, 1995; Madon et al., 2001), even though the occasional occurrence of dramatic events could affect the perception of social groups (Sherif & Sherif, 1969).

These rather pessimistic interpretations encouraged a generation of researchers to devote most of their energy to process instead of content issues. Starting in the 1970s and up through the present day, the social cognition approach produced an enormous body of knowledge and shows no signs of waning (Fiske & Taylor, 2008; Hamilton, 1981; Kunda, 1999; Macrae & Bodenhausen, 2000; van Knippenberg & Dijksterhuis, 2000). Thanks to these efforts, one now has a much better understanding of the processes at work when people meet with members of social groups. Indeed, perceivers may well hold a rich system of stereotypical beliefs, but this does not mean that such knowledge will be used to judge a specific person (Kunda & Spencer, 2003). For a stereotype to exert an influence, the target person must be categorized as a member of the stereotyped group. Once categorization has taken place, the stereotype must be activated, that is, rendered accessible in the perceivers' mind. Only then can stereotypical knowledge be applied in judgment. The outcome of this process will be very much dependent on the nature of the target information in relation to preexisting stereotypical beliefs, as well as on the concerns and cognitive resources of the social perceiver (Fiske, Lin, & Neuberg, 1999; Yzerbyt & Corneille, 2005).

Turning to categorization first, research using category confusion techniques, such as the "who-said-what" paradigm (Taylor, Fiske, Etcoff, & Ruderman, 1978) has long suggested that category membership, especially race, sex, and age, are spontaneously used to classify people (Fiske, 1998; Klauer & Wegener, 1998; Maddox & Chase, 2004). Individuals identify sex or race of familiar people presented to them even before they can give the person's name (Macrae, Quinn, Mason, & Quadflieg, 2005). Recent neurophysiological evidence confirms that race, followed by sex, come into play both quickly and with little cognitive effort (Ito & Urland, 2003), although this does not mean that category activation always occurs, and that mere exposure would suffice to initiate categorization (Gilbert & Hixon, 1991; Macrae, Bodenhausen, Milne, Thorn, & Castelli, 1997; Macrae, Hood, Milne, Rowe, & Mason, 2002).

Assuming the presence of minimal processing objectives, several factors determine which category (of the three "primary" ones but also among a host of others) will eventually be selected, with the consequence that other categories will be neglected (Bodenhausen & Macrae, 1998). Obviously, features that directly concern the stimulus, such as its mere prototypicality (Blair, Judd, Sadler, & Jenkins, 2002; Livingston & Brewer, 2002; Maddox & Gray, 2002) or its accessibility (Castelli, Macrae, Zogmaister, & Arcuri, 2004), and contextual cues, such as the solo status of a particular category member, play an important role (Mitchell, Nosek, & Banaji, 2003). In one study emphasizing the role of target information in general and behavioral hints in particular (Macrae, Bodenhausen, & Milne, 1995), people categorized an Asian woman as a woman when they observed her putting on makeup but thought of her as an Asian when they witnessed her eating with chopsticks.

Beyond these reality constraints linked to the stimulus and its context, perceivers' specific goals (Pendry & Macrae, 1996) or their partisanship (Fazio & Dunton, 1997) also orient and facilitate the selection of a particular category. Illustrating the intrusion of motivational concerns, compared with people who are not strongly attached to their group, high identifiers more readily classify social targets as members of the outgroup (Castano, Yzerbyt, Bourguignon, & Seron, 2002), a phenomenon called "ingroup overexclusion" (Leyens & Yzerbyt, 1992). In general, stereotypical knowledge merges with prejudice to fuel categorization. When Hugenberg and Bodenhausen (2004) asked prejudiced and nonprejudiced participants to classify pictures that blended White and Black facial features, the former, but not the latter, relied on the faces' emotional expressions and more readily categorized an angry face as Black and a happy face as White.

Some researchers have challenged the idea that categorization is a prerequisite for stereotype activation, proposing instead that features of the stimulus may trigger stereotypical knowledge directly. For instance, Blair and her colleagues (2002) argued that people are conditioned through cultural experiences to associate prototypically African features (e.g., dark skin) with negative traits (e.g., lazy), allowing a person's characteristics to activate a stereotype independent of categorization. As a matter of fact, more prototypically African Black people are negatively stereotyped to a greater degree (Blair et al., 2002), arouse more negative emotions (Livingston & Brewer, 2002), and if presented as defendants considered for the death

penalty, are more readily sentenced to death (Eberhardt, Davies, Purdie-Vaughns, & Johnson, 2006).

A wealth of evidence confirms that encountering a category label sets off stereotypical knowledge (Dovidio, Evans, & Tyler, 1986; Gaertner & McLaughlin, 1983; Perdue, Dovidio, Gurtman, & Tyler, 1990). However, a minimal amount of cognitive resources would seem necessary for this to occur (Gilbert & Hixon, 1991; Spencer, Fein, Wolfe, Fong, & Dunn, 1998). Building on this evidence, Wittenbrink, Judd, and Park (1997, 2001; see also Blair, 2001; Dovidio, Kawakami, Johnson, Johnson, & Howard, 1997) designed a stereotyping measure in which participants have to indicate whether a string of letters is a word or a nonword. Whereas some of the words are stereotypically associated with Blacks, others are associated with Whites. Before the presentation of the words and the nonwords, participants are subliminally presented with one of three primes: the label White, the label Black, or a string of Xs. As predicted, prejudiced participants respond faster (slower) to Black stereotypical words when primed with the Black (White) label and faster (slower) to White stereotypical words when presented with the White (Black) label. Other techniques, such as the *Implicit Association Test* (IAT; Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998), although primarily conceived as a measure of prejudice, have also been adapted to gauge stereotypical beliefs by assessing the association between a category label and selected stereotypical features (Amodio & Devine, 2006; Fazio & Olson, 2003; Rudman, Greenwald, & McGhee, 2001; Wittenbrink & Schwarz, 2007; see Banaji & Heiphetz, volume 1). Alternatively, a number of authors have looked at how the confrontation with a category label shapes people's perceptions of objects in ways that are indicative of their stereotypical views (Judd, Blair, & Chapleau, 2004; Payne, 2001; Payne, Lambert, & Jacoby, 2002). For instance, the mere presence of a Black face enhances perceivers' ability to detect degraded images of crime-relevant objects (Eberhardt, Dasgupta, & Banaszynski, 2003; Eberhardt, Goff, Purdie, & Davies, 2004).

The strength of people's stereotypical associations has also been gauged by asking people to take part in computer gamelike situations and make split-second reactions, as in the work on the shooter bias (Correll, Park, Judd, & Wittenbrink, 2002). In these studies, participants are shown pictures of a series of individual targets, some are African American and others are European American, who either hold harmless objects in their hands (e.g., a can of soda) or a weapon (e.g., a handgun) and are asked to make "shoot"/"don't shoot" decisions. The findings confirm that the stereotype linking African Americans to danger underlies participants' decisions (Correll, Park, Judd, & Wittenbrink, 2007). Importantly, the more police officers are trained, the less they fall prey to

the automatic evocation of the stereotype and the more they rely instead on the actual presence or absence of a weapon (Correll, Park, Judd, Wittenbrink, Sadler, et al., 2007). On a related note and building on the fact that group representations rest on deeply learned associations linking a category and stereotypical features, Kawakami and her colleagues (Kawakami, Dovidio, Moll, Hermsen, & Russin, 2000; Kawakami, Dovidio, & van Kamp, 2005) suggested that specific learning aimed at altering these associations should have a direct impact on the expression of, and possibly eliminate, prejudice and discrimination.

Several factors modulate the stereotype activation process. Again, cognitive load is a major player in the field. Processing consistent information frees cognitive resources (Macrae, Milne, & Bodenhausen, 1994). But when they have resources to do so, perceivers also allocate their attention to inconsistent information. They visibly do so to explain away conflicting evidence and keep their stereotypical impressions both coherent and unaltered (Yzerbyt, Coull, & Rocher, 1999), even when cognitive capacity is low and especially when they are prejudiced (Sherman, Conrey & Groom, 2004; Sherman, Lee, Bessenoff, & Frost, 1998; Sherman, Stroessner, Conrey, & Azam, 2005). Illustrating once more the role of reality constraints, contextual cues shape the specific stereotype content that is being activated. For instance, Wittenbrink, Judd, and Park (2001) found that photographs depicting Black men in positive contexts (e.g., in church) triggered more positive associations than photographs depicting Black men in negative contexts (e.g., in a ghetto-looking, graffiti-strewn background). Apparently, the different contexts led participants to categorize the targets according to different subtypes (e.g., churchgoer vs. gang member) within the larger category of African Americans (Devine & Baker, 1991; Stangor, Lynch, Duan, & Glass, 1992).

People's vested interests may also facilitate or inhibit stereotype activation (Blair, 2002; Kunda & Spencer, 2003; Yzerbyt & Corneille, 2005). For instance, the more perceivers aim at integrating information about the targets, understanding the targets, or even explaining why the targets behaved the way they did, the more stereotypical information is likely to be activated (Kunda, Davies, Adams, & Spencer, 2002). Next to this comprehension goal, stereotype activation may provide perceivers with a means to self-promote and self-protect (Fein, Hoshino-Browne, Davies, & Spencer, 2003; Fein & Spencer, 1997; Sinclair & Kunda, 1999), but also to adjust socially (Fein et al., 2003). In contrast, the motivation to avoid prejudice, typically found among people who hold chronic egalitarian goals, should decrease stereotype activation (Moskowitz, Gollwitzer, Wasel, & Schaal, 1999; Olson & Fazio, 2002, 2004; Towles-Schwen & Fazio, 2003).

Once a stereotype is activated, cognitive and motivational factors again determine whether this knowledge will be used to color judgments, shape emotions, and orient behaviors. Availability of cognitive resources has generally been associated with the inhibition of stereotype application (Bodenhausen, 1990; Gilbert & Hixon, 1991; Pendry & Macrae, 1994). Building on ego-depletion theory (Muraven & Baumeister, 2000), which holds that people's mental resources can be depleted through use, Govorun and Payne (2006) found that participants were more likely to use stereotypes when judging a Black person after having been confronted with a demanding Stroop task. Recent behavioral and neuropsychological evidence confirm that stereotype inhibition indeed comes at a cognitive cost (Richeson & Shelton, 2003, 2007; Richeson et al., 2003; Richeson & Trawalter, 2005; Richeson, Trawalter, & Shelton, 2005). Last but not least, incidental emotions—that is, those emotions not associated with a social target but that people bring with them to the situation—have also been found to moderate stereotype application as a function of the processing strategies that are used (Bodenhausen, Mussweiler, Gabriel, & Moreno, 2001). Regarding motivational factors, accuracy and accountability goals, for instance, encourage perceivers to neglect stereotypes and turn to individuating information instead (Lerner & Tetlock, 1999; Weary, Jacobson, Edwards, & Tobin, 2001). The same holds for interdependence concerns (Fiske, 1998). In contrast, self-enhancement goals, such as when self-esteem is under threat, facilitate the application of stereotypical knowledge (Sinclair & Kunda, 2000).

Content of Stereotypes

Most distinctive of the past decade is that, after a long intermission during which process issues occupied center stage, researchers returned to the question of the content of stereotypes. Echoing a viewpoint championed by the *realistic conflict theory* (RCT; LeVine & Campbell, 1972) and what continues to be its best-known empirical demonstration by Sherif (1966), contemporary theorizing about the appraisal step has confirmed that much of the way intergroup relations unfold can ultimately be traced back to the members' understanding of the nature of the relations between their group and other groups, as well as their understanding of the relative positions of the groups. These representations then shape group members' beliefs and opinions about themselves and about the members of the other group. Given the limited number of structural variables that constrain people's stereotypes, only a small number of stereotypical "themes" should emerge in people's characterization of social groups. Counter to the idea that social groups could, in principle, be associated with any sort of feature, the argument here is that stereotype content is, in fact, predictable.

Building on earlier work by Phalet and Poppe (1997) on national stereotypes, and echoing a great deal of work on person perception (Peeters, 1983; Wojciszke, 1997) and personality psychology (Bakan, 1966), the *stereotype content model* (SCM; Fiske, Cuddy, Glick, & Xu, 2002; Fiske, Xu, Cuddy, & Glick, 1999) defines two fundamental dimensions of social perception, warmth and competence, predicted, respectively, by perceived competition and status. Whereas allies are judged as warm and competitors are judged as not warm, high status confers competence and low status incompetence. Somewhat similarly, *image theory* (Alexander, Brewer, & Herrmann, 1999; Alexander, Brewer, & Livingston, 2005; Brewer & Alexander, 2002) holds that intergroup goal compatibility and relative status, but also power to attain goals, are three dimensions that trigger specific group images (ally, enemy, barbarian, dependent, and imperialist).

In several studies, Fiske, Cuddy, and Glick (Cuddy, Fiske, & Glick, 2008; Fiske, Cuddy, & Glick, 2007) asked participants to place a variety of social groups along the two dimensions of warmth and competence. The resulting locations were not only reliably predicted by the relative status and the cooperative nature of intergroup relations, but were also highly similar from one culture to another, suggesting the universal applicability of these dimensions (Cuddy et al., 2009). Whereas the correlation between status and competence is remarkably high, the link between cooperation and warmth is less impressive. One possible account for this pattern is that conflict may involve either actual resources or more symbolic aspects. Whereas the first type of conflict may connect more to issues of sociability, the second type may be more linked to issues of morality. Although both sociability and morality contribute to warmth, there is also room for discrepancy, thereby weakening the link between competition and warmth. In any event, more research is needed to uncover the impact of perceived threat on the ascription of warmth.

Research on the SCM shows that ingroups generally obtain high levels of warmth and competence. Also, all quadrants of the bidimensional space are populated. That is, several groups end up in the ambivalent quadrants that correspond to two kinds of mixed stereotypes, namely, one combining high competence but low warmth and in other encompassing high warmth but low competence. Compared with a simplistic view in which characterizations of social groups are either positive or negative, such a view of stereotypical content in terms of two dimensions allows one to understand the emergence of complex and seemingly conflicting perceptions of social groups. As will become clear later in this chapter, it also adds much power to the prediction of emotional and behavioral reactions.

Whereas early work on the relations between these two dimensions showed warmth and competence to be

somewhat positively correlated (Rosenberg, Nelson, & Vivekananthan, 1968; for a review, see Abele, Cuddy, Judd, & Yzerbyt, 2008)—a phenomenon known as the halo effect—more recent efforts point to the existence of a moderately negative relation (Cuddy, Norton, & Fiske, 2005). For instance, Judd, Yzerbyt, and colleagues (Judd, James-Hawkins, Yzerbyt, & Kashima, 2005; Kervyn, Yzerbyt, Judd, & Nunes, 2009; Yzerbyt, Kervyn, & Judd, 2008) presented their participants with a series of behaviors allegedly performed by the members of two groups: one high and the other low on one of these two dimensions (e.g., competence), and both groups ambiguous on the second dimension (e.g., warmth). Impression ratings revealed the presence of a so-called *compensation effect* in that the group that was higher than the other on the first, manipulated dimension was now also seen as lower than the other on the second, unmanipulated dimension (see also, Yzerbyt, Provost, & Corneille, 2005). This compensatory relation emerges whenever observers compare social targets (Judd, James-Hawkins, et al., 2005), but only for these two dimensions (Yzerbyt et al., 2008), underscoring their fundamental nature.

Next to studying the beliefs and opinions of people with respect to the characteristics (i.e., physical features, personality traits, and behaviors) typically expected in members of certain social groups (i.e., stereotypes) (Devine & Elliot, 1995), research has also devoted growing attention to the role of metastereotypes—that is, people's beliefs regarding the stereotypes that members of other groups hold about them. In one of the first studies to provide evidence for the existence of such metastereotypes, Vorauer, Main, and O'Connell (1998; Vorauer, Hunter, Main, & Roy, 2000) asked White Canadian participants to estimate the beliefs that Aboriginal Canadians held about Aboriginal Canadians and White Canadians. As predicted, White Canadians thought that Aboriginal Canadians associated some traits more to the outgroup than to their ingroup. Vorauer et al. (1998) also showed that more prejudiced participants thought that Aboriginal Canadians held more positive views of White Canadians than less prejudiced participants. Judd, Park, Yzerbyt, Gordijn, and Muller (2005) further explored the nature of such attributed stereotypical beliefs and showed that people expect outgroup members to exhibit more intergroup evaluative bias and outgroup homogeneity than they themselves do.

As Vorauer (2006) has argued, individuals' sensitivity to metastereotypes will be a function of the evaluative concerns that they have as a result of the uncertainty of the situation and the importance attached to the outgroup's point of view in that setting. This work ties in to a number of other studies on intergroup pluralistic ignorance; that is, people may sometimes misconceive the views held by members of other groups and embrace a line of action that fuels segregatory reactions (Shelton, Dovidio, Hebl, & Richeson, 2009). For example, Shelton and Richeson (2005) found that Whites and Blacks give divergent explanations about their own and their potential outgroup partner's failure to initiate contact. Specifically, individuals explained their own inaction in terms of their fear of being rejected because of their race, but they attributed outgroup members' inaction to a lack of interest for the intergroup interaction. The work on metastereotypes is also related to recent efforts showing that skills such as perspective-taking can greatly improve the quality of intergroup relations. When people have some sense of how members of other groups appraise things, and themselves in particular, this may help to adjust behaviors and avoid misunderstandings (Galinsky, Ku, & Wang, 2005; Galinsky & Moskowitz, 2000).

Perhaps paradoxically, the emphasis on structural factors in orienting people's appraisals of social groups has the distinct advantage that it stresses the flexible nature of stereotypical depictions. Depending on the nature of the specific comparison being contemplated, groups can be characterized in various ways (Turner et al., 1987; van Rijswijk & Ellemers, 2002; van Rijswijk, Haslam, & Ellemers, 2006; Wyer, Sadler, & Judd, 2002). Research also suggests, however, that the two fundamental dimensions constrain social creativity. That is, inferiority on one of these two facets (e.g., competence) encourages people to affirm superiority on the other (e.g., warmth), with a compensatory relation emerging rather quickly (Demoulin, Geeraert, & Yzerbyt, 2007; Kervyn, Yzerbyt, Demoulin, & Judd, 2008).

Homogeneity, Entitativity, and Essentialism

Stereotyping others has, of course, much to do with the evaluative and semantic meaning of the features associated with a social category, but this is not the end of the story. People consider that traits are stereotypical of a given group when they think that these traits are more likely in this group than in another group or in the general population (McCauley & Stitt, 1978). Whereas stereotypicality corresponds to the percentage of group members believed to possess some attribute, dispersion concerns the perceived spread of the feature among group members (Park & Judd, 1990). In what comes close to a definitional issue, categorization reduces the perceived variability within groups and increases the perceived difference between groups. First noted by Tajfel and Wilkes (1963), this accentuation effect has since been replicated several times (McGarty & Penny, 1988; Queller, Schell, & Mason, 2006). Interestingly, this effect emerges more readily on dimensions that are likely to maximize discrimination (Corneille & Judd, 1999) and for uncertain judgments (Corneille, Klein, Lambert, & Judd, 2002). This

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categorical accentuation effect biases people's memory, as shown in the who-said-what paradigm studies (Taylor et al., 1978) and in more recent studies concerned with face perception and memory (e.g., Corneille, Huart, Becquart, & Brédart, 2004; Eberhardt et al., 2003; Levin & Banaji, 2006). Other research reexamined the classic cross-race bias (i.e., people's better memory for same-race than for cross-race faces) under a social categorization perspective (e.g., Hugenberg, Miller, & Claypool, 2007; Michel, Corneille, & Rossion, 2007). The important take-home message here is that differential levels of expertise with the ingroup versus the outgroup are not the sole factor at work. Instead, people tend to encode faces differently as a function of their ingroup versus outgroup status, with more individuation and holistic processes driving the encoding of ingroup compared with outgroup faces.

On a related note, one would anticipate that accentuation affects both categories equally, but a large body of evidence indicates that when perceivers belong to one of the two categories, outgroup rather members come across as more alike than ingroup members (Messick & Mackie, 1989; Mullen & Hu, 1989). Whereas some account for this so-called *outgroup homogeneity effect* in terms of greater amounts of interaction, and thus familiarity with ingroup members than with outgroup members (Linville, Fischer, & Salovey, 1989; Linville, Salovey, & Fisher, 1986), others favor a dual-storage model according to which people process information at a more abstract level when it concerns the outgroup rather than the ingroup (Park, Ryan, & Judd, 1992; van Bavel, Packer, & Cunningham, 2008). Still other authors argue that outgroup homogeneity emerges because people spontaneously appraise outgroups in the context of an intergroup comparison, whereas they examine ingroups more readily at the intragroup level (Haslam, Oakes, Turner, & McGarty, 1995). According to this reasoning, both groups should be seen as equally homogeneous when perceivers contemplate them at a comparable level of specificity. In addition to more cognitive and contextual factors, motivational concerns also seem to shape the perception of group homogeneity. Outgroups come across as more homogeneous when they are threatening (Corneille, Yzerbyt, Rogier, & Buidin, 2001). In contrast, the ingroup appears more homogeneous than the outgroup for members of numerical minorities (Kelley, 1989; Simon, 1992) and for people who identify with their ingroup (Castano & Yzerbyt, 1998), especially on ingroup-defining features and in a context where the value of the ingroup is questioned (Doosje, Ellemers, & Spears, 1995). In summary, whenever some sort of divergence or threat colors the relations between two groups, homogeneity emerges in social perception. Although accentuation is presented as faulty because it means going beyond the data, people may well

exaggerate the actual similarity between group members to respond to the demands of the situation, conferring validity to the perception of homogeneity.

Homogeneity is one aspect of *entitativity*, a concept initially coined by Campbell (1958) to refer to the "degree of having the nature of a real entity, of having real existence" (p. 17). It is fair to say that this concept gained much popularity since the late 1990s (Yzerbyt, Judd, & Corneille, 2004). Inspired by early efforts by Hamilton and Sherman (1996) and Brewer and Harasty (1996), Lickel and colleagues (2000) attempted to uncover how people perceive a variety of groups and how different group properties are associated with the degree to which a group is seen as an entity. Entitative groups are characterized by high levels of interaction and similarity, their importance, and the presence of common goals and outcomes. Perception of entitativity triggers what Hamilton, Sherman, and Maddox (1999) call "integrative processing," a mode of dealing with information that is more systematic and extensive, and resembles what perceivers do when confronted with an individual person (Hamilton, Sherman, & Castelli, 2002). Perhaps because people perceive entitative groups as more real and efficient, and therefore more likely to meet their members' needs, such groups stimulate ingroup members to identify with them (Castano et al., 2003; Yzerbyt et al., 2000) and incite potential new members to join (Hogg, 2004; Hogg et al., 2007).

Theoretical and empirical work also suggests that entitativity is related, though not identical, to *psychological essentialism* (Haslam, Rothschild, & Ernst, 2000; Keller, 2005; Miller & Prentice, 1999; Prentice & Miller, 2007; Yzerbyt, Rocher, & Schadron, 1997). Imported from cognitive (Medin, 1989) and developmental psychology (Gelman, 2003) into the social psychology of group perception by Rothbart and Taylor (1992), psychological essentialism refers to perceivers' tendency to ascribe an invisible shared essence (e.g., genes or social background) to all members of a particular group or social category. The evocation of an essence seemingly provides an explanation for visible similarities among members of a group and visible differences between them and members of another group. Importantly, essentialism does not only refer to biological determinism but also entails various other forms of determinism (e. g. social and historical, among others) that incriminate inherent and chronic features of the social targets as causes for what they are and what they do (Rangel & Keller, 2008; Yzerbyt et al., 1997). Even though observers cannot always define this "essence" and it retains a certain element of impenetrability and vagueness (Demoulin, Leyens, & Yzerbyt, 2006; Prentice & Miller, 2007; Yzerbyt, Rocher, & Schadron, 1997), psychological essentialism is now widely seen as a way of appraising human categories that have significant

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social-psychological consequences, mainly because it reliably associates with group differentiation (Martin & Parker, 1995; Yzerbyt, Corneille, & Estrada, 2001), with prejudice and stereotyping (Bastian & Haslam, 2006; Haslam, Rothschild, & Ernst, 2002; Keller, 2005; Levy, Stroessner, & Dweck, 1998; Williams & Eberhardt, 2008; but see Verkuyten, 2003), and with people's willingness to eliminate disparities between groups or across group boundaries (Williams & Eberhardt, 2008).

Several research efforts examined the exact nature of the relationship between entitativity and essentialism (for a review, see Hamilton, 2007). Essentialism is sometimes presented as a global construct encompassing both the underlying dimensions of entitativity on the one hand (uniformity, informativeness, inherence, and exclusivity) and natural kindness on the other (immutability, naturalness, stability, discreteness, and necessity) (Demoulin et al., 2006; Haslam et al., 2000), and indeed, these factors map rather well on what Rothbart and Taylor (1992) called "inductive potential and immutability." Other work more simply distinguishes entitativity and essentialism (Brewer, Hong, & Li, 2004; Yzerbyt et al., 1997), arguing that there is a dynamic relationship between the perception of entitativity (i.e., phenotypic or apparent resemblance among group members) and the ascription of essence (i.e., genotypic or deep-level similarity), each one reinforcing the other (Prentice & Miller, 2007; Yzerbyt et al., 2001). Such a reciprocal influence has been supported in studies that manipulate either essentialism (Brescoll & LaFrance, 2004) or entitativity (Yzerbyt, Rogier, & Fiske, 1998). In line with the idea that an essentialistic stance has more to do with beliefs about, rather than stable characterizations, of social targets, evidence is accumulating that essentialism is dynamic, motivated, and aptly serves strategic concerns in perceivers' specific intergroup context (Morton, Hornsey, & Postmes, 2009; Morton, Postmes, Haslam, & Hornsey, 2009; Plaks, Levy, Dweck, & Stroessner, 2004; Yzerbyt et al., 2004).

Summary

Intergroup relations orient but are also critically affected by people's appraisal of the people and the situations they encounter. Categorizing others as members of categories allows individuals to handle the enormous complexity of the social world. In turn, social categories, with their associated stereotypical beliefs, deliver a huge amount of information at a trivial cost. Research distinguishes three consecutive processes, namely, categorization, stereotype activation, and stereotype application that are shaped by reality constraints, such as cognitive load and target information, and motivational concerns. Recent research also improved our understanding of the factors that shape the content of stereotypes, in denotative and connotative terms.

Specifically, the level of cooperation of a group and its relative status orient perceptions of warmth and competence, the two fundamental underlying dimensions. In addition, earlier work on perceived homogeneity of groups not only led to a revival of interest in the concept of entitativity but also triggered efforts to examine the intrusion of so-called essentialist beliefs in people's representations of groups.

Intergroup Representations

Aside from the stereotypes that people associate with different types of groups, individuals also assess their social environment in terms of its structure and the threats that they face in that environment. It is now a well-established fact that people vary in the extent to which they appraise the intergroup structure in hierarchical terms. *Social dominance orientation* (SDO; Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle, 1994) is concerned with individuals' beliefs that some groups are superior (i.e., high status) to others (i.e., low status), and that such hierarchical organization of groups in a society is a normal and unavoidable situation. These ideologies have proved to be sensitive to contextual variables such as one's social status (Guimond, Dambrun, Michinov, & Duarte, 2003; see later in this chapter). In addition to hierarchy beliefs, other elements of the social environment also influence people's attitudes and behaviors in intergroup relations. By structural appraisals, one refers to the overall structure of intergroup relations encompassing not only specific groups and their relative positioning in the environment, but also other levels of self and group inclusiveness (e.g., individuals, superordinate categories), and the contextual variables that determine the potential for structural changes. The threat appraisals section discusses the different forms of threats (e.g., symbolic, realistic) that group members face when placed in an intergroup situation.

Appraisals of the Intergroup Structure

Ever since the early formulations of SIT, Tajfel and Turner (1979) defended the idea that intergroup behaviors and attitudes in real (rather than minimal) intergroup situations depend both on the strength of one's social identification and the social structural factors that shape the intergroup situation. SCT (Turner et al., 1987) also proposes that, depending on the context, individuals picture themselves at various levels of category inclusiveness. That is, they can categorize themselves as unique individuals (the less inclusive category), as human beings (the most inclusive), or as members of social groups at any intermediate level of inclusiveness. SCT postulates that higher-order, more inclusive social categories provide the background for comparisons among lower-order categories (see also Goethals & Darley, 1977). At the intergroup level, this means that the ingroup

and the outgroup can be recategorized into a single common ingroup, and that the dimensions and norms defining the common ingroup serve as a reference standard against which people evaluate the groups. The more a group comes across as prototypical of the superordinate category, the more positive its evaluation. The *ingroup projection model* (IPM) developed by Mummendey and Wenzel (1999) builds on these notions.

IPM suggests that perceptions of the superordinate category (the frame of reference) are not fixed and stable. Rather, they are social constructions that depend on the vantage point of the perceivers. These social categories are often represented in ways that serve the objectives of the perceiver (Reicher & Hopkins, 2001). As a matter of fact, group members should tend to prefer representations of superordinate categories that favor the ingroup over outgroups. Because relative prototypicality is what influences evaluations of subcategories, groups should disagree on their relative prototypicality, with the ingroup claiming greater relative (but not necessarily absolute) prototypicality for the higher-order category than the outgroup (Wenzel, Mummendey, & Waldzus, 2007). Within the framework of IPM, the appraisal of a group's frame of reference is at stake, and this appraisal influences groups' evaluations. Because the superordinate category is usually appraised as a function of one's group membership, ingroup evaluations are, in most cases, more favorable than outgroup evaluations. The ingroup projection hypothesis has been tested in a variety of intergroup contexts, ranging from university majors (e.g., business vs. psychology in the student context) to national groups (e.g., Italian vs. German in the European context), and using explicit attribute rating method (i.e., calculating the relative profile dissimilarity between subgroup descriptions and the superordinate category; e.g., Wenzel, Mummendey, Weber, & Waldzus, 2003), as well as implicit measurement approaches (i.e., using implicit associations of the subgroups with a superordinate category; e.g., Bianchi, Mummendey, Steffens, & Yzerbyt, 2008; Devos & Banaji, 2005). These efforts suggest that subgroups disagree on each subgroup's relative ability to define the superordinate category that encompasses them.

In an intriguing extension of IPM, several authors argued that one could reduce ingroup's projection tendencies by modifying the inclusive category's representation (Waldzus, Mummendey, Wenzel, & Weber, 2003). Both vaguely defined prototypes and high superordinate complexity countered ingroup projection processes and, as a consequence, increased the outgroup's relative prototypicality of the superordinate category. In turn, the reduction of ingroup projection improved evaluations of the outgroup. Thus, one way to alleviate negative evaluations of outgroup members is by changing the inclusive category's representation. But there

is yet another possibility. If, as suggested by SCT, negative behaviors and attitudes toward a specific outgroup occur as a consequence of people's self-categorization at a certain level of inclusion, it is plausible to argue that by changing people's specific level of inclusion, one would be able to modify their reactions towards the specified outgroup. The change of inclusiveness can take place in both directions. On the one hand, decategorization would occur to the extent that people abandon their social identity to the benefit of their personal identity. On the other hand, recategorization would take place to the extent that people would categorize at a higher level of inclusion. Processes of categorization (recategorization, decategorization, dual categorization) are at the heart of much research that focuses on the implementation of positive intergroup relations (Brown & Hewstone, 2005; Brewer & Brown, 1998; Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000; Oskamp, 2000). These models share the idea that categorization processes affect groups' evaluations and intergroup relations, and that, by changing people's appraisal of social categories, one will also influence group perceptions in a way that benefits intergroup relations. On a similar note, a variety of efforts deal with the impact of people's simultaneous membership in multiple groups (Crisp, Ensari, Hewstone, & Miller, 2002; Crisp & Hewstone, 2007; Vanbeselaere, 1991; Urban & Miller, 1998; for a collection, see Crisp & Hewstone, 2006). Dovidio and Gaertner (this volume) develop and discuss these models in greater detail. It suffices say that changes in the appraisals of categories have a dramatic impact on people's attitudes and behaviors towards members of other groups.

At the most inclusive level of categorization (Turner et al., 1987), social perceivers envisage groups in terms of their human identity. Anthropologists have long recognized that members of human groups consider themselves to be prototypical human beings (Lévi-Strauss, 1952) and downgrade members of other groups to subhuman species levels of categorization. It is only recently, however, that social psychologists began to investigate this phenomenon, and they have considered two distinct, yet related, approaches: *infrahumanization* and *dehumanization*. Whereas the former explores people's perceptions of others as poorer representatives of the human category (*infra-*; Leyens et al., 2000), the latter examines situations in which others are categorized outside of the boundaries defined by the human species (*de-*; Opotow, 1990; Schwartz & Struch, 1989; Staub, 1989). Given that, by definition, all humans belong to the human species, infrahumanization and dehumanization can be considered as biased appraisals of outgroups.

Infrahumanization theory suggests that because people believe that social groups have essential differences (Leyens, Demoulin, Vaes, Gaunt, & Paladino, 2007; Rothbart & Taylor, 1992; Yzerbyt et al., 1997) and because

they are ethnocentric (Sumner, 1906), ingroup members tend to reserve for themselves the human essence and concede to outgroups an infrahuman status (Demoulin et al., 2004; Leyens et al., 2003). The theory rests on three main findings. First, when asked to indicate what is uniquely human, people refer to complex emotions, called "uniquely human emotions" (e.g., love, contempt) as contrasted with nonuniquely human emotions that also characterize animals (e.g. joy, anger). Second, people attribute more uniquely human emotions to their ingroup than to (some) outgroups (Leyens et al., 2001; Paladino et al., 2002). Interestingly, people resent the fact that outgroup members express uniquely human emotions and transgress borders (Gaunt, Leyens, & Demoulin, 2002; Vaes, Paladino, Castelli, Leyens, & Giovanazzi, 2003). Finally, research also shows that the ingroup, but not the outgroup, is linked in memory with uniquely human emotions (Boccato, Cortes, Demoulin, & Leyens, 2007; Paladino et al., 2002). Recent efforts address the issue of moderators and behavioral consequences. For instance, Castano and Giner-Sorolla (2006) have shown that infrahumanization biases are intensified when people are made aware of atrocities perpetrated by their ingroup against outgroup members. It is also noteworthy that conflict is not necessary for infrahumanization to emerge, and low-status groups may also infrahumanize higher-status ones (Cortes, 2005). Infrahumanization constitutes a nice example of the simultaneous emergence of ingroup favoritism and outgroup derogation (Viki & Calitri, 2008).

According to Haslam (2006; see also Haslam, Bain, Douge, Lee, & Bastian, 2005), two different conceptions of humanity allow for two possible forms of dehumanization. When others are denied "uniquely human" features such as culture, logic, maturity, and refinement, one would talk about animalistic dehumanization, that is, the treatment of others as subhuman, animal species. In contrast, when others are deprived of "typical human" features, such as warmth, agency, and curiosity, they are being considered as automata and one would talk about mechanistic dehumanization. Research in the domain of dehumanization has also shown that depending on the stereotypes associated with specific social categories, perceivers activate different kinds of nonhuman stereotypes. For instance, whereas businesspeople (lacking emotionality and openness) are implicitly associated with automata, artists (lacking self-control and civility) are linked to subhuman, animal species (Loughnan & Haslam, 2007). In addition, outgroups that are viewed as lacking both warmth and competence (see the SCM discussed earlier, Fiske, Cuddy, Glick, & Xu, 2002) trigger dehumanizing responses as evidenced by neuroimaging research (Harris & Fiske, 2006) and perspective-taking data (Harris & Fiske, in press). Dehumanization

biases are not without dramatic consequences for their targets. For instance, Goff, Eberhardt, Williams, and Jackson (2008) have recently demonstrated that the stereotype of Blacks as apelike creatures in American society alters basic cognitive processes such as visual perception and attention. This stereotype has also been found to increase endorsement of violence against Black suspects.

Clearly, the way people appraise the structure of group relations at different hierarchical levels of inclusiveness has important consequences for intergroup relations and determines beliefs, attitudes, and behaviors. But the social world is also appraised for its potential to trigger threat for one group's resources, identity, or values.

Appraisals of Intergroup Threat

During the 1960s, Muzafer Sherif conducted a series of field studies that set the stage for the development of Realistic Conflict Theory (Sherif, 1966; see also Campbell, 1965; LeVine & Campbell, 1972, Sherif & Sherif, 1969) and, more broadly, for the foundation of the whole field of intergroup conflict (Fiske & Taylor, 2008). Participants in his studies were 11- and 12-year-old White, middle-class, Protestant boys who thought they were attending a summer camp. Boys were initially assigned to two groups and given time to get to know one another within each group. The existence of the other group was then revealed to them, and elements of competition were introduced by setting up a series of games in which goals could be attained by only one group at a time, (i.e., negative interdependence). These conditions were sufficient for the emergence of hostility, derogation, and aggressive behavior toward the other group. Sherif concluded that prejudice and discrimination arise as a result of competition between groups for resources (e.g., prestige, money, goods, land, status, or power) that both groups desire. To the extent that group members perceive that the other group represents a threat to their own resources, conflict will emerge and intergroup relations will deteriorate (for a review, see Jackson, 1993). Importantly, individual self-interest need not be involved for the perception of threat to be activated. Threatening the interest of one's own group is sufficient to produce outgroup derogation (Bobo, 1983). Finally, RCT emphasizes that hostility is directed toward the source of the threat. In contrast, classic scapegoat theories (Zawadzki, 1948), although recognizing that threat triggers hostility, propose that hostility is redirected to a weak and safe-to-target outgroup (for a critical argument, see Glick, 2002).

According to RCT, then, competition for scarce resources is a prerequisite for the emergence of conflict. As a matter of fact, Sherif and Sherif (1969) considered that, when goals are complementary rather than conflicting, (i.e., positive interdependence), relations between the groups should

be positive. This view is questioned by recent work on *relative deprivation theory* (RDT; for a recent review, see Walker & Smith, 2002). RDT stipulates that when people compare their current situation with their past situation or with the current situation of others and this comparison turns out to be unfavorable, they feel deprived and experience dissatisfaction. That is, people need not be objectively deprived in absolute terms to experience deprivation. They need only to perceive that they fare poorly compared with others (Tyler & Smith, 1998).

A difference is made between personal, also called "egoistic," and group, also called "fraternal," relative deprivation (Runciman, 1966). Group relative deprivation refers to the perception that a group, with which one's identification is high is deprived relative to an outgroup. Only group, but not personal, relative deprivation is thought to be related to intergroup variables (e.g., prejudice; Vanneman & Pettigrew, 1972). Pettigrew, Christ, Wagner, Meertens, van Dick, and Zick (2008) tested this proposition using three large-scale European surveys. They found that both personal and group relative deprivation are stronger among low-status individuals and correlate with a sense of political inefficacy. Whereas the two measures tend to correlate highly, only group relative deprivation serves as a proximal correlate of prejudice, and it fully mediates any relationship observed between personal relative deprivation and prejudice (see also Tougas & Beaton, 2001). Such empirical evidence is far from trivial because it counters a mounting view that low-status groups are bound to legitimize the system (Jost & Banaji, 1994).

These studies largely demonstrated that when individuals perceive their group as deprived compared with other groups in their environment, they display greater levels of intergroup antagonism and prejudice. The subsequent question then is whether a favorable outcome in the comparison process would, in turn, attenuate or reverse detrimental effects of relative deprivation. Grofman and Muller (1973) were the first to contrast relative deprivation from relative gratification in a correlational study. Their conclusion was strikingly counterintuitive in that the obtained pattern of results revealed a V-curve relationship: Both relatively deprived and relatively gratified individuals manifested greater potential for political violence. Similarly, Guimond and Dambrun (2002) reasoned that the V-curve pattern should also characterize the relationship between both relative deprivation and gratification of a group and this group's propensity to express prejudice toward outgroups. They confirmed this hypothesis in two studies in which they manipulated and compared temporal relative deprivation and relative gratification (i.e., declining or improving job opportunities, respectively) with a control condition, and found that both deprivation and gratification increased

prejudiced tendencies (Dambrun, Taylor, McDonald, Crush, & Méot, 2006). This pattern is consistent with a large body of literature suggesting that prejudice and discrimination are not only exhibited by relatively deprived, low-status people, but that they also, and maybe even more intensely, characterize individuals and groups that occupy a relatively high, favorable position on the dimensions of comparison (Bettencourt, Dorr, Charlton, & Hume, 2001).

Concrete resources are not the only elements that can create threat for a given group and tensions between groups. As a case in point, symbolic threats refer to threats resulting from conflicting values and beliefs that can exist in the absence of conflict over material resources. For instance, Biernat, Vescio, and Theno (1996) found that, in the American society, Whites who believe that Blacks do not support White values evaluate Blacks more negatively than Whites who do not face such value threat. *Symbolic racism theory* (Kinder & Sears, 1981) proposes that contemporary prejudice against Blacks originates from the perception that Blacks violate traditional American values such as individualism (Sears, 1988; Sears & Henry, 2003, 2005; Zanna, 1994).

Stephan and Stephan (2000, 2001; Stephan & Renfro, 2002) have attempted to combine different types of threat into a single *integrated threat theory* (ITT). According to ITT, realistic and symbolic threats can simultaneously account for the prediction of intergroup attitudes (see also Neuberg & Cottrell, 2002, and their biocultural model of intergroup emotions and behavior presented later in this chapter). Realistic threats encompass intergroup conflict and competition over scarce resources, as well as relative group deprivation. Symbolic threats arise from perceived differences in values, attitudes, beliefs, and moral standards. Moreover, intergroup anxiety and negative stereotypes constitute additional threats that should be taken into account in the prediction of intergroup prejudice (these latter threats are extensively detailed in the next section). Strong support for ITT has been found across a number of different intergroup contexts such as ethnicity (Stephan et al., 2002), sex (Stephan, Stephan, Demitrakis, Yamada, & Clason, 2000), and immigration (Stephan, Ybarra, & Bachman, 1999).

Two additional intergroup threats, based in SIT (Tajfel & Turner, 1979), were not included in Stephan and Stephan's ITT. According to SIT, people seek membership in positively distinct social groups. Both the "positive" and the "distinct" facet of this assumption can be threatened in intergroup relations. Threats to positive evaluations of the ingroup, called "group esteem threat," occur when the image of the ingroup is threatened by an outgroup. As it turns out, group esteem threats impact attitudes and behaviors toward the source of threat (e.g., Branscombe, Spears, Ellemers, & Doosje, 2002) but also attitudes toward outgroups unrelated to

the threat (Leach, Spears, Branscombe, & Doosje, 2003). Similarly, intergroup similarity, (i.e., *distinctiveness threat*), increases intergroup bias and influences intergroup behaviors, especially for high-identifying ingroup members (Jetten, Spears, & Manstead, 2001; Jetten, Spears, & Postmes, 2004).

In their 2006 meta-analytic review of intergroup threat, Riek, Mania, and Gaertner examined all six different types of threats (i.e., realistic threat, symbolic threat, intergroup anxiety, negative stereotypes, group esteem threat, and distinctiveness threat) simultaneously. They concluded that integrated models of threats are efficient in understanding how threats impact intergroup attitudes and behaviors. They proposed a model of intergroup threat in which ingroup identification, distinctiveness threat, and stereotypes all act as antecedents to realistic, symbolic, and group esteem threats. The relationship between the latter threats and outgroup attitudes as well as intergroup behaviors is mediated by intergroup anxiety and other types of emotions. To date, this integrative model still lacks empirical support, and other moderators, such as group status, probably need to be included to fully understand the impact of threat appraisals on intergroup relations, but it is clear that current research efforts take the direction of a greater integration of structural and threat appraisals.

Summary

The distinction between structural and threat appraisals is reminiscent of similar distinctions in the intergroup literature. Take, for instance, the SCM described earlier (Fiske, Cuddy, & Glick, 2002). Stereotype content varies along two fundamental dimensions, that is, warmth and competence, which depend on appraisals of intergroup competition and relative status, respectively. In all likelihood, intergroup competition and status differential are just two incarnations of the ubiquitous appraisals of threat and structure, respectively, of an intergroup setting. As explained earlier, the critical issues are to determine the intentions of the other groups (their threat) and their potential to enact these intentions (their status).

FROM PREJUDICE TO EMOTIONS

This section first presents classic theories of prejudice, then turns to more recent contributions that specifically examined people's emotional reactions to intergroup situations, while clearly disentangling the cognitive, emotional, and behavioral components of attitudes. Although these theories often also address the cognitive and behavioral components of intergroup relations in their formulations, evaluations, affect, and emotions are their main focus. The

section ends by looking at theories that focus on specific emotions.

Prejudice

Prejudice (i.e., the negative evaluation, affect, or emotion that a person feels when thinking about or interacting with members of other groups) has occupied the center stage in research on intergroup relations (Jones, 1997; for a recent collection, see Dovidio, Glick, & Rudman, 2005). More often than not, researchers examining prejudice focus on the perspective of the members of the dominant group. However, members of dominated groups are also likely to be prejudiced against members of dominant groups and, indeed, this issue has become a major focus in recent investigations (Swim & Stangor, 1998). First, this section examines the work on personality factors such as empathy and self-esteem. Next, the attention is directed to authoritarianism and social dominance, and recent efforts that cast these individual differences in terms of ideological beliefs influenced by specific types of socialization, as well as by transient considerations of the dynamic relations between groups and group members. This subsection ends with a quick discussion of the role of conservatism and religion. The next subsection reviews contemporary conceptions of prejudice, examining, in turn, modern racism, aversive racism, and ambivalent sexism.

From Personality Factors to Ideologies

Over the years, several individual difference variables have been linked to prejudice. Two outstanding personality characteristics are empathy and self-esteem. Empathy—that is, the ability to feel the emotions experienced by others as a result of being able to see the world from their point of view (Batson, Early, & Salvarani, 1997; Batson, Chang, Orr, & Rowland, 2002)—has been found to comprise four components (Davies, 1994): perspective taking, empathic concern, personal distress, and fantasy. Research shows that empathy is negatively related to several measures of prejudice (Whitley & Wilkinson, 2002), and that empathic concern produces powerful prosocial and even altruistic motivations (Dovidio, Piliavin, Schroeder, & Penner, 2006). Presumably, people take others' perspective because they value their welfare, which then facilitates empathic concern (Batson, Eklund, Chermok, Hoyt, & Ortiz, 2007). To the extent that group membership is associated with the plight of the target, the positive attitude directed toward the target likely generalizes to the entire group (Batson et al., 2002). Interestingly, temporary factors alter the amount of empathy that people feel for another person. In one illustrative study, Batson and colleagues (2002) confronted participants with a heroin addict and drug dealer serving a

prison sentence. Compared with participants in a so-called objective perspective condition, which required them not to get caught up in how the target felt, and instead remain objective and detached, participants in the perspective-taking condition, which had them imagine how the target felt and how this affected his life, felt more empathy and showed less prejudice for the groups to whom the target belonged (Galinsky & Ku, 2004; Galinsky & Moskowitz, 2000; Vescio, Sechrist, & Paolucci, 2003).

For more than half a century, self-esteem—that is, people's evaluations of their personal characteristics—ranked high as a potential cause for prejudice. Presumably, people with low self-esteem rely on prejudice as a means to bolster their own self-image by looking down on others (Leary, 2007). As mentioned earlier, the proposition that successful discrimination enhances self-esteem has received substantial empirical support (Verkuyten, 2007; for reviews, see Aberson et al., 2000; Rubin & Hewstone, 1998). In contrast, the impact of self-esteem on bias and prejudice is less clear. Apparently, individuals high in self-esteem are more likely to be biased, perhaps because they are less troubled by expressing prejudice in explicit ways, whereas individuals low in self-esteem are more sensitive to situational factors that constrain the expression of bias (Aberson et al., 2000). In line with the self-projection view of group identity (Gramzow & Gaertner, 2005; Krueger, 2007; Otten & Wentura, 2001), individuals high in self-esteem may also be expected to manifest bias for their ingroup more easily because they project their characteristics, and thus their sense of self-worth, on other ingroup members. In contrast with chronic low self-esteem, momentary threats to self-esteem may fuel prejudice in the hopes of restoring self-esteem to prethreat levels (Fein & Spencer, 1997; Fein et al., 2003; Spencer et al., 1998; but see Crocker & Luhtanen, 1990).

After the Second World War, the Holocaust and its unimaginable horror triggered an enormous amount of research on anti-Semitism. This work pointed to the role of a character structure, known as the "authoritarian personality syndrome" (Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswick, Levinson, & Sanford, 1950; Allport, 1954), in the emergence of prejudice. Authoritarianism is characterized by blind submission to authority, rigid thinking, conventionalism and conservatism, patriotism, and aggression toward those who do not conform to one's standards. In line with a hydraulic view, the hatred toward outgroups observed among adults emerges as the result of internal conflict experienced in childhood between people's love for and idealization of their parents, and their unacceptable impulses toward their parents in response to a strict, punitive, and dominant parenting style. Much of the interest in this syndrome waned over the years, mainly because of methodological and conceptual problems, and a growing focus on social and cultural variables.

The modern version of authoritarianism, known as "right-wing authoritarianism" (RWA; Altemeyer, 1981, 1988, 1996) resurrected some of the main ideas. RWA avoids lots of the Freudian baggage that was present in prior versions of authoritarianism. People high in RWA are characterized by high levels of submission to established and legitimate authorities, of aggressiveness toward persons who appear to be sanctioned by those authorities, and of adherence to social conventions. Research shows that people high in RWA tend to view things in black or white and divide the world into ingroups and outgroups. They are mentally inflexible and have little tolerance or interest for complex answers and new experiences. In contrast, they have a high need for closure. They also view the world as a dangerous and threatening place, which makes finding security one of their prime concerns. For this reason, they value the protection of their group and the guidance afforded by its authority figures. As a set, these characteristics predispose people high in RWA to be prejudiced against a wide variety of groups (Altemeyer, 1998; Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 1992).

Another individual difference that is currently seen as a set of beliefs is SDO and refers to "the extent to which one desires that one's ingroup dominate and be superior to outgroups" (Pratto et al., 1994, p. 742). SDO comprises a component of group dominance, reflecting the belief that the ingroup ought to be at the top of the social ladder, and a component of opposition to equality, corresponding to the belief that subordinate groups should remain where they are (Jost & Thompson, 2000). Sidanius and Pratto (1999) showed that people high in SDO prefer to see inequality among groups, with their group occupying the higher position. Conversely, higher levels of SDO characterize people who belong to powerful groups. As one would expect, people high in SDO are prejudiced against members of groups who question the legitimacy of a system that puts them in the superior position and who strive to force them to share resources. Tough-minded and lacking empathy, they also see their relationship with other groups as a win-lose situation. Legitimizing myths are a key notion in SDO theory and consist of beliefs that people high in SDO use to justify the disadvantaged position of subordinate groups, despite the wide disapproval of prejudice. Instances of such myths are meritocracy, the Protestant Work Ethic, and just world beliefs. Stereotypes, both positive and negative, provide individuals high in SDO with a rationale for their convictions (Whitley, 1999). Positive stereotypes are particularly pernicious when they allow individuals high in SDO to maintain subordinate groups in a low-status position while appearing to attribute desirable features.

Although both RWA and SDO impact prejudice, research demonstrates that these two constructs are only weakly correlated (Duckitt, 2001), even if they seem to

interrelate more as people grow older (Duriez & van Hiel, 2002). The key difference between RWA and SDO is that RWA is mainly concerned with threats perceived to be associated with other groups and, as a consequence, with relations within groups characterized by conformity and even submission to authority figures to avoid these threats (Petersen & Dietz, 2000). In contrast, SDO refers to relations between groups in the context of a competition for resources, with the dominance of the ingroup over the outgroup being the center of attention (Wilson & Liu, 2003). In an attempt to address both the similarities and differences between RWA and SDO, Duckitt (2001, 2005, 2006) proposed and tested a model that distinguishes a number of psychological dimensions leading to prejudice and ethnocentrism. The initial version of the model predicts that two socialization practice dimensions, called "punitive" and "unaffectionate socialization," impact two personality dimensions, social conformity and tough-mindedness, respectively. These two personality dimensions then influence two worldviews: belief in a dangerous and competitive-jungle world, respectively. In turn, both personality and worldview impact RWA and SDO. These ideological attitudes have independent causal influences on ethnocentrism (pro-ingroup attitudes) and prejudice (anti-outgroup attitudes). Research confirms that RWA and SDO predict negative attitudes toward the same groups but also prejudice against different groups (threatening groups such as drug dealers or homosexuals in the case of RWA and subordinate groups such as immigrants or the physically disabled in the case of SDO), reflecting the fact that RWA pertains to social cohesion and security concerns, whereas SDO is rooted in the motivation to maintain or establish group dominance and superiority (Duckitt, 2003; Duckitt & Fisher, 2003; Esses, Dovidio, Jackson, & Armstrong, 2001).

Both RWA and SDO are now widely seen as ideologies, that is, sets of beliefs and attitudes that predispose people to view the world in certain ways and to respond accordingly. As a matter of fact, social factors or even transient situational factors (e.g., failure on a test, positions of power) exert a direct influence on these apparently deeply engrained "personality" variables and, as a result, on the experience and expression of prejudice. Duckitt (2005, 2006) also emphasized the role of threatening and competitive group contexts on RWA and SDO, respectively, via the specific worldviews that these social situations promote. Also stressing the power of social factors, Guimond and colleagues (2003) showed that the specific major that people select in college affects their SDO. Not only do law school students manifest higher levels of SDO than do psychology students at the outset of their university trajectory, confirming the idea that people high in SDO are attracted to powerful professions, but SDO scores of law students

increase, whereas those of psychology students decrease over the years of study. Even more striking, Guimond and colleagues showed that a simple manipulation that assigned participants to a high-power as opposed to low-power role could influence SDO levels. In both cases, SDO mediated the impact between power and prejudice. These and other efforts (Danso & Esses, 2001; Schmitt, Branscombe, & Kappen, 2003) need replications, but they suggest that SDO is better seen as a set of beliefs that proves sensitive to strategic concerns emerging in a dynamic context of intergroup relations (Turner & Reynolds, 2003).

To be sure, researchers have examined other ideological orientations, as well as personal values that are thought to generate prejudice. Conservatism has long been linked to prejudice (Adorno et al., 1950; Allport, 1954; see Jones, 2002), and recent work indicates that this relationship can best be accounted for by the endorsement of various beliefs, such as RWA and SDO (Federico & Sidanius, 2002; Whitley & Lee, 2000), that are then likely to favor the adoption of a conservative political stance and to feed prejudiced responses. Conservatism is also conducive to prejudice because it entails a strong faith in personal responsibility for one's negative outcomes, whereas the propensity to blame the victim appears less strongly engrained among more liberal people (Skitka, Mullen, Griffin, Hutchinson, & Chamberlin, 2002). Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, and Sulloway (2003) recently argued that political conservatism is best seen as motivated social cognition, serving a range of ideological (e.g., group-based dominance), existential (e.g., terror management), and epistemic (e.g., intolerance of ambiguity) motives.

Contrary to a widely held conception, greater religiosity is linked to prejudice and intolerance. Reviewing some 38 studies conducted over a 50-year period, Batson, Schoenrade, and Ventis (1993) concluded that religion is not related to increased compassion and love for others, but rather to stronger stereotyping, prejudice, and discrimination. Interestingly, research also shows that exposition to religious primes increases submission to both prosocial (Pichon, Boccato, & Saroglou, 2007) and antisocial (Saroglou, Corneille, & Van Cappellen, 2009) requests. The link between religious orientation and prejudice is thus a complex one. Viewing religion as a quest and a search for answers to the meaning of life is associated with open-mindedness and tolerance for outgroups (Batson, Floyd, Meyer, & Winner, 1999; Hunsberger, 1995). In contrast, fundamentalism is related to prejudice (Spilka, Hood, Hunsberger, & Gorsuch, 2003).

Types of Prejudice

Prejudice comes as a major determinant of discriminatory behavior, and one goal that stands high on the agenda of

researchers on intergroup relations is to measure people's level of prejudice. Fortunately, explicit prejudice—or what is sometimes referred to as "Jim Crow Racism" in the race domain (Sears, Hetts, Sidanius, & Bobo, 2000)—has become a rarity, and few people would assert the biological superiority of Whites and express stereotypes that Blacks are lazy and stupid. But although old-fashioned forms of blatant prejudice have become markedly less common than when Bogardus (1925) proposed the social distance scale (Devine & Elliot, 1995), prejudice is still alive and well, albeit in more subtle forms (Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986; Swim, Aiken, Hall, & Hunter, 1995). Many people have not yet fully accepted the norm of equality, but they are also reluctant at seeing themselves (or being seen) as prejudiced, at least with respect to the vast majority of stigmatized groups (but see Crandall & Eshleman, 2003). For the sake of clarity, three broad perspectives on contemporary prejudice can be distinguished, embodied in the constructs of modern racism, aversive racism, and ambivalent sexism (Dovidio & Gaertner, 2004; Gawronski, Peters, Brochu, & Strack, 2008; McConahay, 1986; Sears & Henry, 2003; Glick & Fiske, 1996).

Theories of modern racism and symbolic racism (McConahay, 1986; Sears & Henry, 2003, 2005; Sears & McConahay, 1973) hold that the conflict between people's egalitarian goals and their negative feelings about minorities is best resolved by claiming that discrimination no longer exists (McConahay, 1986; Swim et al., 1995). Although they endorse equality (of opportunity) as an abstract principle, modern racists also see their hostility to antidiscrimination policies (such as affirmative action) as being based on rational grounds (such as issues of fairness and justice). The rationalization process builds on a series of interrelated arguments, namely, that prejudice and discrimination are things of the past, that any subsisting inequality is a consequence of the character of its victims, that protest about contemporary disadvantage is unjustified, that victims seek special favors, and that a number of benefits are illegitimate. At the end of the day, modern racists have the impression that they are treated unfairly and they feel deprived. According to Sears and colleagues (Sears, 1988; Sears & Henry, 2003; Sears, Henry, & Kosterman, 2000; Sears, Sidanius, & Bobo, 2000), this process is rooted in negative feelings about minorities in general, and African Americans in particular, acquired through socialization and in a set of beliefs that includes incomplete knowledge of the minority group, traditionalism, and high group self-interest. Closely linked to modern-symbolic racism, subtle prejudice is a construct that Pettigrew and Meertens developed to study prejudice against ethnic groups in Europe (Meertens & Pettigrew, 1997; Pettigrew & Meertens, 1995). Compared with modern racism, one belief that is

also associated with subtle prejudice is the exaggeration of cultural differences. Both strands of research focused on individual differences and contributed to the development of specific scales (McConahay; Pettigrew & Meertens, 1986, 1995). Although modern and subtle racism scales correlate with old-fashioned and blatant racism scales respectively, these scales are not entirely redundant and do uncover useful variability among individuals. Differences between more modern and more traditional forms of racism materialize into different types of discrimination.

The work on aversive racism (Dovidio & Gaertner, 1998, 2004) suggests that this dissociation between supporting an egalitarian value system while at the same time experiencing negative feelings toward minorities as a result of socialization encourages people to deny the existence of any unflattering emotional reactions and pretend that members of minority groups evoke only positive feelings. As detailed in the next section, the motivation to appear unprejudiced, combined with the inescapable experience of discomfort, uneasiness, and fear, leads aversive racists to avoidance behavior and disengagement or, when contact cannot be prevented, to ambiguous behaviors or even overcompensation. In this perspective, negative feelings toward minorities can leak out in subtle and rationalizable ways. More often than not, rather than discriminating against minorities, aversive racists may choose to favor their own group. Because the assumption here is that all people likely fall prey to this emotional ambivalence (Dovidio & Gaertner, 1991, 2004), research on aversive racism demonstrates a much stronger focus on the way situational demands modulate the expression of prejudice. That is, rather than counting on any specific scale to gauge the specific degree of aversive racism, researchers count on the emergence of a gap between more traditional measures of prejudice, where it is expected that respondents will show no prejudice, and more recent, so-called implicit, measures, on which the expression of prejudice is generally difficult to control (Blair, 2001; Dovidio, Kawakami, & Beach, 2001; Hofmann, Gawronski, Gschwendner, Le, & Schmitt, 2005; McConnell & Leibold, 2001; Rudman, Greenwald, Mellott, & Schwartz, 1999).

A variety of these implicit measures of prejudice, some more technologically demanding than others, are now part of the researcher's toolkit (Wittenbrink & Schwarz, 2007; see Banaji & Heiphetz, volume 1). Two popular techniques, known as affective priming (Dovidio, Kawakami, Johnson, Johnson, & Howard, 1997; Fazio, 2001; Fazio, Jackson, Dunton, & Williams, 1995; Klauer, 1998) and the IAT (Greenwald et al., 1998), rest on the assumption that concepts are associated with one another in memory (Fazio & Olson, 2003). Presumably, these and other tools (Payne, Cheng, Govorun, & Stewart, 2005) allow researchers to assess individuals' levels of prejudice in a way that bypasses

their attempts to exert control over their responses and are, therefore, quite distinct from their overt responses (but see Olson, Fazio, & Hermann, 2007). There is, however, a growing debate as to the exact meaning of IAT responses and whether they remain truly impervious to extraneous influences and respondents' strategic considerations (de Houwer, Beckers, & Moors, 2007; Fiedler, Messner, & Bluemke, 2006; Klauer, Voss, Schmitz, & Teige-Mocigemba, 2007; Steffens & Buchner, 2003). Similar concerns surface with respect to affective priming (Teige-Mocigemba & Klauer, 2008). Also, because most implicit measures rely on semantic associations, they may not necessarily reflect respondents' endorsement of such associations but rather deeply engrained cultural influences. Related to the contemporary search for indirect measures of prejudice, a consideration of social neuroscience theory (see Lieberman, volume 1), methods, and techniques to examine intergroup phenomena is clearly growing. A number of authors now rely on neural activity to trace critical aspects of group processes and relations (Eberhardt, 2005; for a critical assessment, see Dovidio, Pearson, & Orr, 2008).

Conceptualizing conflict yet differently, the work on *ambivalent sexism* (Glick & Fiske, 1996) suggests that prejudiced people, mainly men, may simultaneously cultivate hostility against nontraditional women (i.e., showing hostile sexism), while praising traditional ones (i.e., manifesting benevolent sexism). In this framework, hostile sexism sees women and men as opponents, with women either trying to control men by marriage, sexual deceit, and a constant demand for attention, or fighting them in a battle of the sexes where feminists threaten men's power and identity. In contrast, benevolent sexism puts women on a pedestal, because they are considered pure and good creatures that stand by their men and nurture their children, but confines them to their traditional role of homemaker because they are presumed to be weak and incompetent (Glick & Fiske, 1999, 2001a, 2001b, 2001c). For many, the construct of benevolent prejudice may come across as an oxymoron, but within contemporary theorizing about racism, sexism, and other "isms," Glick and Fiske (1996) were among the first to suggest that prejudice does not only come in the conventional form of derogatory views and hostile affective reactions but may also be expressed in terms of flattering beliefs and positive emotional responses. According to Glick and colleagues, both sexisms serve to justify relegating women to stereotyped roles in society (Glick & Fiske, 2001a). This line of work led to the construction of the Ambivalent Sexism Inventory, a measure with good psychometric properties that assesses both types of sexism.

Confirming the prediction that ambivalent sexists would entertain a rather Manichean view of women, they tend to classify women in more polar-opposite categories (whore vs. caretaker) than nonsexist men (Glick, Diebold, Bailey-Werner, & Zhu, 1997; see also Haddock & Zanna, 1994). Research confirms that benevolent sexism correlates with hostile sexism (Glick & Fiske, 1996) and with negative implicit attitudes about women (Rudman, Greenwald, & McGhee, 2001), although this coexistence among men is generally underestimated by women (Kilianski & Rudman, 1998; Rudman & Kilianski, 2000). Together with the disturbing finding that benevolent sexist items are often endorsed by women themselves, the ironic consequence of such ignorance is increased resistance to the elimination of sexism. To the extent that women may actually hold a favorable attitude toward benevolent sexist men, women overlook their traditional beliefs while implicitly authorizing men's beliefs about male superiority (Glick & Fiske, 2001c). The same problem arises among men who may refrain from questioning their negative views about women in light of the presence of other (seemingly) positive attitudes. Research on ambivalent sexism spurred new work on ambivalent forms of group perception, which was referenced earlier in the section on representation, and prejudice, which we return to later when examining emotional reactions.

Summary

Since the 1990s, evaluations, affect, and emotions have (re)gained a prominent status within research on intergroup relations. Whereas classic work on prejudice emphasized chronic individual differences, current wisdom has it that the majority of these factors (i.e., authoritarianism, social dominance) are better conceptualized as ideological beliefs than as enduring personality syndromes. It is also clear that prejudice, rather than disappearing, has changed its appearance. More traditional forms of racism have receded, and most people openly support equality of opportunity. Unfortunately, many continue to feel negative about minorities and stigmatized groups. This psychological clash between socially appropriate responses and personal desires among people who hold contemporary prejudices can be seen as a modern version of the conflict idea at the heart of the work on authoritarianism. The research on modern racism, aversive racism, and ambivalent sexism constitute various proposals that address in more detail the mechanisms underlying this discrepancy. One noteworthy outcome of these efforts is the emergence of a variety of sophisticated measurement tools designed to bypass people's attempts at hiding their prejudiced reactions. One difficult issue with many of the so-called implicit measures is whether they truly reflect people's untainted and genuine prejudice rather than long-term cultural influences or short-lived strategic concerns.

Group-Based Emotions

The 2000s witnessed an outbreak of research on the various emotional reactions associated with intergroup contexts. First, the more traditional approaches often tended to examine affective reactions of individuals "as an individual" both toward ingroups and toward outgroups. If the impact of group membership on the nature and intensity of feelings was sometimes assumed, it was rarely assessed. Second, researchers simply tended to take into consideration positive feelings toward the ingroup (ingroup love) and negative feelings toward the outgroup (outgroup hate), often seeing them as opposites of each other and failing to consider them as potentially distinct. Today, the message is that a proper understanding of people's emotional reactions in intergroup contexts is best achieved by also taking into consideration their representations and beliefs on the one hand, and their intentions and behaviors toward the various groups on the other. Because they are shaped by such structural factors as interdependence and status, and the way these aspects are subjectively experienced, emotional reactions are not only diverse, they are also complex and highly specific. In turn, these distinctive emotional responses translate into specific patterns of attitudinal and behavioral responses. Moreover, there is a growing realization that one needs to distinguish between emotions felt as members of a group and those felt as individuals. Finally, and importantly, people may experience emotional reactions about the ingroup, about the outgroup, about their relations, as well as about a host of other events.

When examining contemporary work on this front, an influential source of inspiration remains Stephan and Stephan's (1985) work on intergroup anxiety. According to these authors, people experience a feeling of discomfort and distress in real or anticipated interactions with outgroup members. Because of negative prior contact or because of prejudicial attitudes, negative thoughts and beliefs about outgroups, individuals come to expect negative outcomes during interactions with members of these groups. Negative expectations vary from fear of rejection (by the outgroup if the interaction goes badly or by the ingroup if the interaction succeeds), of exploitation, or of domination, to the perception that one's values or beliefs might be attacked (Lazarus, 1991), or that the situation involves little control for the person (Dijker, 1987).

More recently, Smith (1993, 1999) developed the *intergroup emotion theory* (IET). IET can be seen as an adaptation of appraisal theories of emotion (Arnold, 1960; Frijda, 1986; Frijda, Kuipers, & ter Schure, 1989) in the intergroup domain (for early research along this line, see Dijker, 1987). Building on RDT (Runciman, 1966), SIT (Tajfel & Turner, 1979), and SCT (Turner et al., 1987), Smith (1993) proposed that people likely appraise situations, experience emotions, and express behaviors as members of social groups rather than as individuals. In other words, people conduct their cognitive evaluation of a situation from the perspective of the group member. Situations are appraised, not for their relevance to the individual, but for their relevance to the group to which the individual belongs. This depersonalization process is crucial to understand what the appropriate stakes are *vis-à-vis* the stimulus. Just as people turn to their ingroup to determine what their beliefs and behaviors should be, a phenomenon at the heart of *referent informational theory* (Turner, 1991), they rely on their group identity to work out the fundamental characteristics of the situation, to react emotionally on them, and to take appropriate action. As a matter of fact, adding to a host of indirect demonstrations that people can psychologically function as group members rather than as individuals (Oakes, Haslam, & Turner, 1994; Turner et al., 1987), Smith and others (Smith et al., 1999; Smith & Henry, 1996; Tropp & Wright, 2001) have provided evidence that the way people define their self and their ingroup may overlap in significant ways.

Taking into account the fact that IET rests both on appraisal theories of emotions and on SCT, researchers have used two strategies to reveal the group nature of people's emotional reactions. The first, embraced by Smith, Mackie, and colleagues (Mackie & Smith, 2002), addresses the appraisal portion of the model. If people function at the group level, they should prove sensitive to changes in appraisals regarding the relation between their group and some other group. This is most easily achieved by modifying structural aspects of the intergroup situation. For instance, Mackie, Devos, and Smith (2000) reasoned that the strength of the ingroup position on some opinion debate should influence group members' emotions and action tendencies. Participants made to believe that their ingroup was in a strong (weak) position felt more (less) angry and wanted to oppose the outgroup more (less). Moreover, anger proved to be a mediator of the impact of collective support on the tendency to confront the outgroup (Mackie, Silver, & Smith, 2004). Further research confirmed that responding in accordance with the emotionally induced action tendency dissipated the emotion and triggered satisfaction (Maitner, Mackie, & Smith, 2006).

The second strategy directly speaks to the self-categorization aspect of the phenomenon and was adopted by Yzerbyt and colleagues (for a review, see Yzerbyt, Dumont, Mathieu, Gordijn, & Wigboldus, 2006). The key idea is that when people meet with specific events, how they appraise the situation will be crucially influenced by their salient social identity, which provides the lenses through which the situation is seen (Ray, Mackie, Rydell, & Smith, 2008; Smith, Seger, & Mackie, 2007; Yzerbyt

et al., 2003, 2006). In a study taking advantage of the linguistic divide in Belgium, Yzerbyt, Dumont, Wigboldus, and Gordijn (2003) gave their French-speaking Belgian students a newspaper article informing them about a decision from the board of a Flemish-speaking university to enforce English as the standard language for Flemish-speaking students in their master's degree program. Presumably, students at this Flemish-speaking university strongly disapproved of this new policy. As predicted, inducing participants to see themselves as students in general rather than as students of their French-speaking university, together with their attachment to the group of students in general, combined to produce higher levels of anger (but not of other emotions) and stronger offensive action tendencies (but not other action tendencies). Moreover, in line with cognitive appraisal theories of emotion, participants' emotional reactions mediated the interactive impact of the transient contextual salience of a shared social identity and participants' chronic group identification with the group on action tendencies (Gordijn, Wigboldus, & Yzerbyt, 2001; Yzerbyt et al., 2003, 2006). Follow-up research confirmed that subtle manipulations of identity not only orient the way people appraise events (Gordijn, Yzerbyt, Wigboldus, & Dumont, 2006) but also how group-based emotions materialize in actual behaviors (Dumont, Yzerbyt, Wigboldus, & Gordijn, 2003; for a related approach on helping behavior, see Levine, Prosser, Evans, & Reicher, 2005; Stuermer, Snyder, & Omoto, 2005; Stuermer, Snyder, Kropp, & Siem, 2006).

Next to its emphasis on the flexible nature of people's identity, recent research on group-based emotions allows breaking the unitary construct of prejudice into various components: Several specific emotional reactions may be examined in response to specific appraisal dimensions. It thus comes as less of a surprise that some cognitive evaluations (i.e., stereotypes) that could be understood as positive characterizations of a group (e.g., competent) are sometimes associated with negative feelings (e.g., envy). Capitalizing on the benefits of this new conceptualization, a number of models related to IET emerged, such as *image theory* (Alexander et al., 1999; Alexander, Brewer, & Livingston, 2005), Neuberg and Cottrell's (2002) *socio-functional threat-based approach*, and Fiske, Cuddy, and Glick's *SCM* and *BIAS map* (Cuddy, Fiske, & Glick, 2007; Fiske, Cuddy, & Glick, 2002, 2007). Previous sections dealt with the cognitive component of the SCM and of image theory, whereas the focus here is placed on the emotional aspects.

According to Neuberg and Cottrell (2002; Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005), people's dependence on the group during evolutionary history made them sensitive to threats to group-level resources and to obstructions to efficient group functioning. Intergroup emotions are a response to these group-level threats because they help people to deal with them effectively by fostering adaptive behavioral intentions. In one illustrative study, Cottrell and Neuberg predicted and found that different groups that were believed to pose qualitatively distinct threats to ingroup resources or processes evoked qualitatively distinct and functionally relevant emotional reactions, despite the fact that all groups scored equally high on a general prejudice measure. For instance, participants thought that gay men threatened their values and personal freedoms and posed a threat to their health (via a perceived association with HIV/AIDS). As a consequence, and in line with predictions, participants reported high levels of disgust and pity. This unique association for gay men was clearly distinguishable from appraisal and feelings observed for other groups. Such findings confirm that the traditional conception of prejudice as a general attitude may often obscure the rich panoply of emotions that people feel toward different groups. In a similar vein, *image theory* (Alexander et al., 1999; Brewer & Alexander, 2002) holds that the specific images associated with different groups (ally, enemy, barbarian, dependent, and imperialist) likely trigger different emotional reactions. For instance, in the enemy situation, the dominant emotional experience is characterized primarily by anger toward the other. However, perceived equal power and cultural status would also trigger respect, envy, and jealousy. Combination of these characteristics with a perception of threat triggers frustration, fear, and distrust (Alexander, Levin, & Henry, 2005).

The SCM (Fiske, Cuddy, Glick, & Xu, 2002; Fiske, Xu, Cuddy, & Glick, 1999; Glick & Fiske, 2001c) and its recent heir, the BIAS map (Cuddy, Fiske, & Glick, 2007, 2008), deal with the way specific relations between groups and their associated appraisals of groups and group members translate into a complex texturing of emotional reactions, which, in turn, feed into a range of unique behavioral reactions. Research on a wide variety of groups, replicated in several cultures (Cuddy et al., 2009), shows that the four quadrants defined by groups' relative status and their degree of competition/cooperation foster the emergence of four ambivalent stereotypes. Two of these stereotypical appraisals are in line with the traditional perspective of an all-positive versus all-negative stereotypical view of groups that commands positive prejudice associated with pride, admiration, affection, and respect on the one hand, and hostile prejudice linked to disrespect, contempt, and hostility on the other hand. The two remaining stereotypes feed a particular type of prejudice that generates a blend of positive and negative emotions. Specifically, the high-competence/low-warmth stereotype, associated with such groups as Asians, feminists, rich people, and the like, generates what Fiske and colleagues (Fiske, Cuddy, Glick, & Xu, 2002; Glick & Fiske, 2001c) call the

"envious" prejudice. This "envious" prejudice provokes a mix of negative (envy, fear, resentment, hostility) and positive (respect, admiration) feelings (Lin, Kwan, Cheung, & Fiske, 2005). In sharp contrast, the low-competence/high-warmth stereotype, attached to groups such as disabled people, the elderly, or housewives, triggers "paternalistic" prejudice with its blend of pity, patronizing affection, and liking on the positive end, and disrespect and condescension on the negative end (Cuddy et al., 2005; Cuddy & Fiske, 2002). This model also spurred intriguing research using functional magnetic resonance imaging techniques (Harris & Fiske, 2006). In line with the prediction that low-competence, low-warmth social targets, such as addicts and the homeless, should trigger the nonsocial emotion of disgust (as opposed to social emotions such as pride, envy, and pity) and be dehumanized, confrontation with pictures of such targets failed to spontaneously activate the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC), a brain zone implicated in social cognitive processing. As it happens, inducing perceivers to individuate such targets, by having them judge the target's food preference, increased activation of the mPFC (Harris & Fiske, 2007).

Even though the underlying rationale for all these efforts is that the beliefs people hold about a target group and its members trigger an intricate array of emotional responses, these recent models remain largely silent as to whether the person appraising the situation and experiencing the emotion is doing so as an individual or as a group member. Operating at either one of these levels is, psychologically speaking, equally real. At the personal level, behavior is shaped by individual emotional reactions to an appraised event or situation. In contrast, when working at the group level, people's beliefs and actions are aligned with their understanding of those features that define their group as opposed to a salient outgroup. Illustrating this mechanism, Verkuyten and Hagendoorn (1997) found that authoritarianism, as an individual difference variable, influenced prejudice when their participants' personal identity was made salient. In sharp contrast, ingroup stereotypes were related to prejudice when national identity was activated. In line with the long-time distinction made by Runciman (1966) between individual relative deprivation and fraternal relative deprivation, a particular social identity can somehow be "selected" so as to influence people's appraisals, emotions, and as we discuss later in this chapter, behavioral reactions.

When scanning this line of research, readers will come across several labels, such as collective emotions (Doosje et al., 1998), intergroup emotions (Mackie et al., 2000), group-based emotions (Bizman, Yinon, & Krotman, 2001; Dumont et al., 2003; Yzerbyt et al., 2006), or vicarious emotions (Lickel, Schmader, Curtis, Scarnier, & Ames, 2005). Each term is associated with nuances regarding

the particular theoretical perspective and the researchers' focus of interest, but the general message remains: People experience emotions as a result of their group membership (Iyer & Leach, 2008; Parkinson, Fischer, & Manstead, 2005; Yzerbyt et al., 2006).

Specific Emotions

Although the earlier efforts address the emotions encountered among members of all sorts of groups and group members, several lines of research focused on specific emotions. Interestingly, some emotions are more readily associated with dominant groups, whereas others are more common for members of dominated groups.

Emotional Reactions of Dominant Groups

Members of dominant groups do not only experience positive emotions. Research has accumulated showing that feelings such as guilt and shame can emerge among members of dominant groups (for recent illustrations, see Brown, Gonzalez, Zagefka, Manzi, & Cehajic, 2008; McGarty et al., 2005). Much of the current interest in these two emotions in the context of group relations can be traced back to a series of studies conducted by Doosje and colleagues (1998) on so-called collective guilt. In one experiment, Dutch participants who were either high or low in identification with their national group read a thoroughly positive, a thoroughly negative, or an ambiguous account of the Dutch colonial history in Indonesia. When the text described the Dutch colonial occupation in ambivalent terms, those participants admitting to having a lower commitment to the group also reported feeling more collective guilt and being more willing to repair relations with the former colony. Presumably, high identifiers felt less guilt because they could count on a number of strategies to deal with and avoid the distressing reaction. Because participants obviously had no involvement in the wrongdoing, the pattern that Doosje and colleagues (1998) reported goes a long way to emphasize the group-based nature of the emotional reaction.

Paralleling guilt at the personal level (Tangney, Stuewig, & Mashek, 2007), group-based guilt is an unpleasant feeling said to occur when people self-categorize as a member of a group, are aware that this group's behavior is (or has been) harmful and unjustified or that its advantageous position is illegitimate, accept the ingroup's responsibility as the perpetrator, and appraise the cost of correcting the wrongdoing to be moderate (Wohl, Branscombe, & Klar, 2006). High identifiers (compared with low identifiers) and presumably those that tend to glorify their ingroup (as opposed to those who adopt a more critical view of their group; Roccas, Klar, & Liviatan, 2004), would seem to feel less group-based guilt

by increasing the perceived variability of the ingroup. For instance, they consider that the members who did the wrongdoing are not "real members" but rather "black sheep" (Marques, Yzerbyt, & Leyens, 1988), or that the ingroup changed over time. More so than low identifiers, high identifiers are also inclined to compare the ingroup favorably with actions of other wrongdoers (Branscombe & Miron, 2004) or to consider the costs of reparation too high (Schmitt, Branscombe, & Brehm, 2004). In contrast, group-based guilt is increased when people focus on the illegitimate behavior of the ingroup rather than on the victimized outgroup (Harth, Kessler, & Leach, 2008; Iyer, Leach, & Crosby, 2003; Powell, Branscombe, & Schmitt, 2005) or recategorize the victims as members of a common ingroup (Gordijn et al., 2006).

Reminders of historical victimization of the ingroup do not render people more sympathetic to the predicament of the outgroup, but instead promote identity protection reactions. Typically, members of the "perpetrator" or advantaged group reduce the responsibility of the ingroup, blame the outgroup, and legitimize the harm inflicted on it (Swim & Miller, 1999; Wohl & Branscombe, 2008). Such a set of responses, in which the rationalization of the ingroup's harmful behavior seems paramount, is reminiscent of the work on relative gratification, which shows that ingroup advantage is often legitimized (Grofman & Muller, 1973; Guimond & Dambrun, 2002). Research confirms that the combination of an ingroup focus and the perception that the ingroup legitimately dominates the outgroup triggers group-based pride (Harth, Kessler, & Leach, 2008; see also Cialdini et al., 1976). Although empirical support remains ambiguous, one would expect people to feel contempt or disdain toward members of what appears to be a rightfully disadvantaged outgroup (Cuddy et al., 2007).

Group-based guilt is an important emotion in the context of intergroup relations because, negative and distressing as this feeling may be, it fuels a series of "approach" reactions aimed at correcting the wrong committed by the ingroup, such as apologies and reparative actions, that ultimately may contribute to positive consequences for the harmed individuals (Brown et al., 2008; Kanyangara, Rimé, Philippot, & Yzerbyt, 2007; McGarty et al., 2005). In contrast, shame, another self-condemnation emotion, is conceptualized as promoting avoidance responses because it puts a more global accent on the dispositional qualities of the wrongdoer and is, therefore, associated with fear of rejection (Tangney, 1995). Shame originates mainly in threats to one's image and, as such, is also more likely to emerge in relation to "identity-related" groups (e.g., ethnic groups) than to interdependence groups (e.g., friends) (Lickel et al., 2005). In addition to guilt or shame, members of dominant groups have also been found to experience anger toward their own group on considering the illegitimate advantage it may enjoy over outgroups (Gordijn et al., 2006; Iyer, Schmader, & Lickel, 2007; Leach, Iyer, & Pedersen, 2006, 2007). A focus on the outgroup also facilitates the emergence of sympathy (Montada & Schneider, 1989).

Emotional Reactions of Dominated Groups

Occupying a low status position is by no means a sure predictor of people's emotional reactions toward the dominant group. In the context of cooperative intergroup relations, members of dominated groups may experience feelings of trust, respect, and admiration toward the people who belong to the dominant group. In contrast, competitive relations often result in envy, jealousy, and resentment, and under certain circumstances, anger or fear. In this regard, the perceived (il)legitimacy of the social hierarchy constitutes a key factor shaping dominated group members' emotional reactions. A large body of literature even addresses the fact that injustice lays the ground for feelings of frustration and anger (Mikula, Scherer, & Athenstaedt, 1998). For instance, relative deprivation theorists, introduced earlier in this chapter (Crosby, 1976; Folger, 1986; Gurr, 1970), suggested that the subjective experience of unjust disadvantage, rather than objective deprivation, is the key triggering factor.

Although perceptions of fraternal relative deprivation would seem to feed directly into collective action, research indicates that the feelings of frustration and anger associated with group-based deprivation are the more powerful predictor (Smith & Ortiz, 2002). Thus, congruent with contemporary approaches of group-based emotions, the affective reactions that derive from the appraisal of injustice fuel a series of behavioral tendencies aimed at changing the allegedly detrimental situation (van Zomeren, Spears, Fischer, & Leach, 2004). One note of caution is in order at this point. Just as a number of rationalization strategies allow guilt and shame to be relatively rare emotional experiences among members of dominant groups, anger with respect to the unfair treatment of the outgroup is not felt as often as one would imagine and even if so, does not necessarily lead to collective action (Klandermans, 1997, 2004; van Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears, 2008). First, in accordance with SIT and SCT, people ought to see themselves as members of the deprived group to feel angry and engage in collective action (Gordijn et al., 2006; van Zomeren, Spears, & Leach, 2008). Identification with the disadvantaged group paves the way for the mobilization of people in favor of social change (Ellemers, 1993, 2002) and allows for the emergence of a politicized identity (Drury & Reicher, 1999, 2000, 2005; Reicher, 2001; Simon & Klandermans, 2001; Simon, Trötschel, & Dähne, 2008; see also Ellemers, Platow,

van Knippenberg, & Haslam, 2003). Another key determinant is the perception of group efficacy (Drury & Reicher, 2005; Reicher, 1996a, 1996b, 2001). In line with the work on group-based emotions, the higher the sense of subjective efficacy the more will people engage in collective actions (Hornsey et al., 2006).

But even before this, theory and research suggest that inequalities in distribution are often perceived as fair and, therefore, unlikely to trigger movements of protest (Jost & Major, 2001). Early on, SIT evoked the possibility that members of low-status groups deal with their predicament by relying on the strategy of social creativity (Lemaine, 1974; Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Social creativity is concerned with the redefinition of the attractiveness of existing group attributes. That is, members of the disadvantaged group come to valorize typically devalued features associated with their groups such as when African Americans claim that "Black is beautiful." Related to the idea of social creativity is the suggestion by *system justification theory* that people often tend to use complementary stereotypes to describe groups in a given society to bolster the system and to maintain the status quo (Kay et al., 2007). To the extent that dominant groups are associated with status and thus with competence, the work on *the compensation effect* suggests that the specific dimensions retained for such creativity are likely to revolve around sociability. Clearly, creativity may well provide some psychological comfort, but it hardly contributes to questioning the social hierarchy.

Although group-based emotions encountered among members of dominated groups are likely to be negative, ranging from envy and anger to sadness, resignation, or even fear, more positive feelings may also emerge in some circumstances. An intriguing line of work focuses on what is known as *schadenfreude*, or the malicious pleasure that derives from seeing a privileged other meet with some misfortune. Building on earlier work in emotion literature (Smith et al., 1996; for a review, see Smith & Kim, 2007), researchers started to examine this rather delicate emotion in intergroup contexts (Leach et al., 2003; Leach & Spears, 2008). A distinction can be made according to whether the spotlight is on the other group or whether people are more preoccupied with the ingroup. In the former case, the emergence of this opportunistic emotion is a reaction to the illegitimate success of the dominant group and the deservingness of its fall. In the latter approach, the pain associated with the inferiority of the ingroup triggers a displacement-like opportunity to compensate for threats to their ingroup status. Not surprisingly, such imaginary revenge emerges more strongly among those who consider the comparative dimension as more relevant and in contexts where such malicious pleasure is seen as legitimate.

Although mainly concerned with individual emotions, research on the impact of ostracism and exclusion on anger, sadness, and fear, and their associated behavioral tendencies also proves highly relevant here (Williams, 2001; for a review, Williams, 2007). In some cases, social rejection triggers antisocial behavior, and this link is mediated by anger but not by sadness (Chow, Tiedens, & Govan, 2008; Leary, Twenge, & Quinlivan, 2006). In other situations, exclusion prompts withdrawal from social contact (Twenge, Catanese, & Baumeister, 2003). Finally, threats to belonging may increase social sensitivity, with people manifesting renewed efforts to connect with others (Gardner, Pickett, & Brewer, 2000; Knowles & Gardner, 2008; Maner, DeWall, Baumeister, & Schaller, 2007; Williams, Cheung, & Choi, 2000). In line with cognitive appraisal theories of emotion, such findings point to the complexity and variability of negative affect in general. Recent work (Molden, Lucas, Gardner, Dean, & Knowles, 2009) suggests that people react rather differently according to whether they are rejected or ignored. Whereas explicit, active, and direct exclusion triggers feelings of agitation and anxiety, and more generally, a concern for preventing further social losses, implicit, passive, and indirect exclusion activates feelings of dejection and sadness, and a motivational state of eagerness and promotion (Higgins, 1997). This work on social exclusion is reminiscent of efforts in the intragroup literature showing that people want to be respected by their fellow ingroup members and, indeed, go a long way to improve their standing in the group if such respect is absent (Ellemers, Doosje, & Spears, 2004). In the intergroup relations domain, a prolific strand of research examined people's reactions to being a victim of discrimination (Crocker, Major, & Steele, 1998; Major & O'Brien, 2005). We come back to this important body of literature in the next section.

Summary

The late 1990s and early 2000s witnessed a real explosion in the attention devoted to emotions in the intergroup context. Combining the lessons from social identity theories with the strengths of appraisal theories of emotions, contemporary researchers went beyond a simplistic view of prejudice in terms of a general and undifferentiated positive or, more commonly, negative feeling toward outgroups and outgroup members. For one thing, people immersed in intergroup situations are likely to respond affectively to appraisals that are shaped not so much by their individual concerns but more so by group interests. For another, the fine distinction afforded by appraisal theories of emotion better correspond to the variety of feelings experienced in intergroup settings. All-purpose labels such as prejudice, favoritism, and bias have been replaced by more specific constructs such as guilt, shame, anger, envy, and *schadenfreude*, among others. Be it from the perspective of the

members of dominant groups or those of dominated groups, current conceptions stress the highly contextual nature of the affects emerging in intergroup settings. The dividend of this more complex but at the same time more nuanced conceptualization of people's intergroup experiences is a more powerful prediction of their intergroup behaviors.

INTERGROUP BEHAVIORS

This section examines the behavioral consequences of cognitive and emotional processes for members of dominant and dominated groups in intergroup relations. Behaviors can take many guises. In regard to explicitness about a person's intention or attitude, behaviors can be more (e.g., rewarding someone's performance) or less (e.g., not commenting on someone's performance) explicit. Importantly, verbal behaviors are often considered to be explicit and nonverbal behaviors implicit forms of behaviors (Crosby, Bromley, & Saxe, 1980; Dotsch & Wigboldus, 2008; Fazio et al., 1995), but this is not necessarily the case (Hebl et al., 2009). Verbal behaviors may also seem more controlled than nonverbal behaviors (e.g., eye blinking), but again this need not be the case because verbal behaviors are sometimes uncontrolled (e.g., verbal [Freudian] slips) and nonverbal behaviors are sometimes very controlled (e.g., adopting a very open, assertive posture during a job interview) (DePaulo, 1992; DePaulo & Friedman, 1998; see Ambady & Weisbuch volume 1).

First, this section reviews those behaviors that arise in individuals as a consequence of their membership in social groups, irrespective of the position that these groups occupy in society. Second, the structural relationships between groups will be taken into account by looking at the specific behaviors of dominant and dominated groups in the intergroup situation. Because the intergroup bias chapter by Dovidio and Gaertner (this volume) is devoted to changes in intergroup relations, this chapter focuses on those behaviors that tend to maintain or reinforce the status quo, rather than on behaviors aimed at changing the situation (e.g., self-regulation, collective action). Behaviors related to maintenance and reinforcement of the status quo may be better understood as actions (i.e., behaviors that actors display to achieve their personal or group goals) on the part of majorities and dominant groups, and reactions (behaviors that actors display in "reaction" to another person or another group's action, or in "reaction" to an existing, "imposed," situation) in the case of minorities and stigmatized groups. Indeed, actions of dominant groups and reactions of dominated groups have largely been studied in relation to status quo maintenance or reinforcement. Importantly, minorities should not be considered as only

reactive "participants" and majorities as active "participants" (Jones et al., 1984; Shelton, 2000). However, again, studies investigating social change rather than status quo emphasize reactions of dominant groups and actions of dominated groups.

This section also follows the historical development in research on behaviors in intergroup relations. After a lengthy emphasis on the dominant side of the relationship, and a briefer focus on the dominated side of the relationship, a new generation of researchers now increasingly understands the importance of simultaneously examining both parts of the interaction (for a collection, see Demoulin, Leyens, & Dovidio, 2009). The ambition is to understand the nature of the interpersonal dynamics of intergroup contact when majority and minority group members are brought together in some specific interpersonal situation (Devine & Vasquez, 1998). In line with this concern, this section ends with a discussion of the more recent research on intergroup interactions.

Group Membership as a Determinant of Intergroup Behavior

The impact of group membership on intergroup behaviors can be examined in two different ways. On the one hand, researchers can assess the extent to which interpersonal behaviors depart from intergroup ones; on the other hand, researchers can contrast people's behaviors toward ingroup and outgroup members. The *interindividual-intergroup discontinuity effect* is concerned with the former (for a review, see Wildschut, Pinter, Vevea, Insko, & Schopler, 2003). Specifically, a discontinuity is said to occur when people display the tendency to be more competitive, or less cooperative, in intergroup than in interindividual situations. Two broad perspectives encompass most of the explanations proposed to account for these effects: the fear-and-greed perspective and the group decision-making perspective (Wildschut & Insko, 2007). In essence, the first account suggests that the interindividual-intergroup discontinuity effect is the consequence of greater fear, as well as greater greed, in intergroup than in interindividual settings. Fear because the greater level of distrust in intergroup contexts triggers the anticipation that outgroup members will compete, thereby enhancing the expectation that one will receive the lowest possible outcome. Greed because a greater probability exists of displaying behaviors that favor the pursuit of the highest possible outcome in the case others are willing to cooperate. In contrast, the group decision-making perspective rests on the assumption that group discussion facilitates the rational comprehension of mixed-motive situations, which triggers competitive responses. Indeed, most of the research in this domain rests on experiments that involve

mixed-motive matrix games such as the prisoner's dilemma game (see also De Dreu, this volume). Although a complete understanding of the discontinuity effect is yet to be achieved (Wildschut & Insko, 2007), a greater amount of empirical evidence seems to support the fear-and-greed explanation over the group decision-making explanation.

A second consequence of group membership relates to the contrasting behaviors that individuals display toward ingroup and outgroup members (Hewstone et al., 2002). In 1906, Sumner introduced the term "ethnocentrism" to refer to people's universal tendency to preferentially be attached to ingroups over outgroups. Researchers traditionally differentiate between behaviors that favor ingroup members (i.e., ingroup favoritism) and behaviors that hurt outgroup members (i.e., outgroup derogation). Allocating more resources to an ingroup, preferring ingroup members in a voting or a recruitment procedure, or complimenting the ingroup's performance are all instances of ingroup favoritism. In contrast, punishing, insulting, beating, torturing, or even killing outgroup members exemplify outgroup derogation. Returning to Tajfel and colleagues' classic minimal group experiments (1971) presented earlier, we already mentioned that intergroup differentiation in minimal intergroup situations is better understood as a bias in favor of the ingroup rather than against the outgroup (Brewer, 1979, 1999). When group members must allocate positive resources to their ingroup and an outgroup, they favor ingroup members over outgroup members. However, when people are required to give aversive treatment, differential behaviors toward ingroup and outgroup members do not emerge as readily (for a review, see Buhl, 1999).

An interesting line of work on contrastive intergroup behaviors concerns the so-called *linguistic intergroup bias* (LIB). Building on earlier work by Semin and Fiedler (1988) on the *linguistic category model* (LCM), Maass (1999) focused on the way people talk about groups in general and groups members' behaviors in particular. The work on the LCM examines the language that perceivers use to communicate about what they observe in their social environment and distinguishes four increasingly abstract categories of language, namely, descriptive action verbs, interpretative action verbs, state verbs, and adjectives. Research has shown that perceivers use the more abstract categories to convey the idea that the observed behavior reveals an inherent and permanent characteristic of the actor (Semin & Fiedler, 1988). In one illustrative study, Maass, Salvi, Arcuri, and Semin (1989) provided evidence that positive (vs. negative) behaviors performed by ingroup members were described in more abstract (vs. concrete) terms, whereas the reverse was true for behaviors performed by outgroup members. In line with earlier work on the so-called ultimate attribution error (Hewstone,

1990; Pettigrew, 1979), the LIB contributes to the maintenance of a positive view of the ingroup and a negative view of the outgroup because more abstract descriptions of behaviors imply that they are caused by enduring features of the actor. Thus, positive and negative behaviors are more revealing of ingroup and outgroup members, respectively. Wigboldus, Spears, and Semin (2005) extended this work, talking about the linguistic expectancy bias. These authors argue that it is not merely the valence of the behavior that prompts different linguistic descriptions, but rather observers' expectations. If the behavior corresponds to (vs. contradicts) what observers expect of the target group, then this behavior will be described in more abstract (vs. concrete) terms. Therefore, even though for Whites, athletic achievements of African Americans are positive behaviors performed by outgroup members, Whites tend to describe them in abstract terms because being good in sports is something that is expected of African Americans. As a whole, this line of research shows that language constitutes a powerful means, and by the same token a rich source of information (von Hippel, Sekaquaptewa, & Vargas, 1997), to convey more or less desirable views about ingroup and outgroup members (Sutton & Douglas, 2008; Wigboldus & Douglas, 2007).

Group members also have the general tendency to avoid members of other groups, and to approach members of the ingroup (Paladino & Castelli, 2008). Encounters with strangers may be more emotionally arousing in intergroup than intragroup contexts, as is suggested, for example, by the higher activation of the amygdala (a subcortical structure known to play a role in emotional learning and evaluation) in White male individuals presented with photographs of Black versus White individuals (Cunningham, Johnson, et al., 2004; Phelps, Cannistraci, & Cunningham, 2003; Phelps et al., 2001; see also Hart et al., 2000). This is also the argument advanced by the intergroup anxiety theory described earlier in this chapter (Stephan & Stephan, 1985). Indeed, the feeling of discomfort that people experience because they expect negative consequences from interactions with outgroup members prompts avoidance of outgroup members and, ironically, reduces the likelihood of having positive intergroup contact that could undermine these negative expectations.

The exact negative expectations that trigger avoidance behaviors in high-status group members may well slightly differ from those expectations that provoke the same reactions in low-status group members. As a matter of fact, high-status individuals are afraid to appear prejudiced (Vorauer, Main, & O'Connell, 1998), whereas low-status individuals are concerned that they might confirm negative stereotypes associated with their ingroup or be discriminated against (Branscombe, Schmitt, & Harvey, 1999). Interestingly,

Shelton and Richeson (2005) argued that the underlying motivation is the same; that is, people fear rejection by the other during intergroup encounters. Fear of rejection-based avoidance behaviors from both parts combined with pluralistic ignorance (the failure to recognize that the same behavior is to be attributed to the same causes) reinforce intergroup misunderstandings, conflict, and the tendency to further avoid outgroup contact.

Summary

A first consequence of group membership is for individuals to behave more competitively, and less cooperatively, than they do when placed in an interindividual situation. A second effect is that people conduct themselves differently toward their ingroup and an outgroup. Favoring the ingroup is group members' preferred line of action and hurting the outgroup is less common. Framed in political terms, the first is reminiscent of patriotism that cherishes the positive features of one's fellow group members, whereas the latter corresponds to a nationalistic stance in which the active derogation of foreigners and enemies of the state stands high on the agenda. Even if the first inclination may appear more benign, both have their drawbacks. Oftentimes, people prefer to avoid outgroup members altogether because of the negative expectations as to how the intergroup encounter may unfold and the assumed potential for unpleasant emotions associated with such situations. A key underlying theme, for members of dominant and dominated groups alike, is fear of rejection.

Actions of Dominant Groups

Bias shows up in a variety of ways. Although it would appear that blatant discrimination has become less common than in the past (Dovidio & Gaertner, 2000), this does not mean that biased treatment based on membership in a social group has disappeared entirely. Rather, discrimination is likely to take on more subtle forms, and several factors moderate the concrete expression of prejudice (Crandall & Eshleman, 2003). Bias may occur at the individual level (i.e., in concrete interactions between members of different groups), or at higher levels of organizations, institutions, or cultures.

Individual Discriminatory Behaviors

Hate crimes are the most extreme and dramatic type of discriminatory behaviors. They consist of criminal offenses against victims chosen solely or primarily on the basis of group membership (Boeckmann & Turpin-Petrosino, 2002; Green, Strolovitch, & Wong, 1998; see also Lickel, Miller, Stenstrom, Denson, & Schmader, 2006). Such behaviors are primarily motivated by beliefs that these criminal actions

are exciting and fun, that the targets are unlikely to react, that the crime is justified (because it is a response to some earlier attack on the offender's group), or that it is simply expected and unlikely to be disapproved by the other members of one's group (McDevitt, Levin, & Bennett, 2002). Both archival studies relying on police reports (Strom, 2001) and survey data (Franklin, 2000) suggest that such offenses are primarily committed by young male individuals. As much as 10% of Franklin's (2000) community college sample indicated having assaulted a homosexual, and another 24% reported engaging in antigay or antilesbian verbal abuse, suggesting that a large number of malevolent acts take place even in social environments that are usually considered to be highly tolerant.

Less visible or evident discriminatory behaviors also contribute to unequal and harmful treatment of members of stigmatized groups. Often unintentional and unnoticed by prejudiced people, subtle discrimination ranges from negative to ambivalent or even to positive behaviors. Perhaps the most obviously negative version of subtle discrimination emerges when offenders have the undisputable feeling that the (discriminatory) behaviors are normal or routine. This situation is likely to materialize when social consensus is believed to be strong. In a study by Sechrist and Stangor (2001), highly prejudiced participants sat significantly farther away from a Black female student than their low-prejudice counterparts, but this distance was greater (smaller) when participants had been led to believe that a majority (minority) of students on campus shared their views (Sechrist & Milford, 2007). Clearly, because people strongly adhere to social prescription when evaluating discriminatory acts, some stigmatized groups are more likely to be the target of prejudiced attitudes and behaviors simply because the (assumed) social norms support such reactions (Crandall, Eshleman, & O'Brien, 2002). People who display discriminatory behaviors against outgroup members may even count on the support of their group members, at least at an implicit level (Castelli, Tomelleri, & Zogmaister, 2008).

At the opposite end of the spectrum, some subtle discriminatory behaviors come across as decidedly positive. These reactions are especially insidious because the targets themselves seldom recognize these behaviors as discriminatory or have a hard time making attributions of prejudice. A nice illustration of such positive behaviors is patronizing speech, whether it takes the form of baby talk (to people seen as cognitively weak) or controlling talk (to people seen as having a low status) (Ruscher, 2001). Benevolent sexism provides another demonstration that behaviors of dominant people can be widely judged as positive yet contribute to reinforcing social hierarchies (Glick & Fiske, 1996; Hebl, King, Glick, Singletary, & Kazama, 2007). Positive as they may appear, such behaviors cause targets to underachieve,

potentially justifying later unequal treatment (Dardenne, Dumont, & Bollier, 2007).

For the most part, behaviors produced by members of dominant groups toward stigmatized targets end up sending an ambivalent message because a general tendency exists to avoid the interaction, because they are expressed in contexts where causes other than prejudice exist or could be invoked as explanations, or because they comprise a mix of negative and positive behaviors. It is possible to contrast two major patterns of behaviors on the part of dominant groups. On the one hand, people try to avoid intergroup interactions; on the other hand, when avoidance would seem problematic or simply impossible, dominant group members do their best to blur the influence of prejudice. The *avoidance* strategy is more likely encountered among aversive racists. Aversive racists want to think of themselves as nonprejudiced and supporting egalitarian values, but they harbor unconscious negative feelings and beliefs about Blacks (Dovidio & Gaertner, 2004). On top of concerns about how they are seen by members of the dominated group (Vorauer, 2006; Vorauer et al., 2000), the level of discomfort, anxiety, and even threat experienced in intergroup encounters (Blascovich, Mendes, Hunter, Lickel, & Kowai-Bell, 2001; Mendes, Blascovich, Lickel, & Hunter, 2002; Plant & Devine, 2003; Stephan & Stephan, 2000) is such that the general preference of bigots is to stay away from interactions or at least intimate or nonscripted contacts, a strategy that is equally conducive to ambivalence by inaction rather than by action (Towles-Schwen & Fazio, 2003).

The *camouflage* strategy often emerges when interaction seems inevitable. In those cases, the implicit negative experience toward stigmatized persons will be actualized in ways that tend to conceal the fact that prejudice is present, often in the eyes of both the perpetrator and the victim (Dovidio, Smith, Donnella, & Gaertner, 1997; Esses, Dietz, & Bhardwaj, 2006; Gaertner & Dovidio, 1977, 2000; Gaertner, Dovidio, & Johnson, 1982; Uhlmann & Cohen, 2005). Factors that allow the expression of prejudice include ideological and religious beliefs, values, and stereotypes, and various rationalization processes that obscure the presence of bigotry such as attribution of blame or the furnishing of acceptable behavioral accounts (Crandall & Eshleman, 2003). In many ambiguous situations, behavior will not be so much antiminority, but rather biased in favor of the dominant group (Hodson, Dovidio, & Gaertner, 2002). Ambiguity sometimes serves the purpose of avoidance. In a clever study illustrating the way people conceal discrimination when they are forced to take action, Snyder, Kleck, Strenta, and Mentzer (1979) asked their nondisabled participants to watch a movie playing in a room with a disabled individual or in a room with a nondisabled individual

(both of them confederates). When told that the exact same movie was playing in the two rooms, participants chose to watch the movie slightly more often alongside the disabled individual. In contrast, when instructions mentioned that different movies were playing in the two rooms, providing an occasion to explain their avoidance of the stigmatized person in terms of their movie preference, participants chose to watch the movie with the other person. A similar strategy prevails among modern racists who, for instance, will oppose affirmative action because, in their eyes, it violates equal opportunity, not because they refuse to accept racial equality (Sears, Sidanius, & Bobo, 2000). In other words, modern racists combine their deep antipathy for Blacks with a genuine endorsement of egalitarian values by trying to act in ways that appear unprejudiced.

In general, the fact that people can rely on justifications that allow them to escape external or internal sanction facilitates the expression of prejudice (Crandall & Eshleman, 2003). In accordance with this idea, Monin and Miller (2001) found that when majority members' past behaviors have established their moral credentials as nonprejudiced people, they seem more willing to act in ways that could be seen as prejudiced. In contrast, the salience of earlier prejudicial behavior may decrease the ease with which people come to discriminate. For instance, Son Hing, Li, and Zanna (2002) capitalized on induced hypocrisy (Aronson, 1999) to create a situation that mirrors the logic of moral credentials. These authors first gave their participants a chance to advocate egalitarian values and then asked them to recall past episodes in which they had reacted negatively toward members of stigmatized groups. Aversive racists felt more guilty and uncomfortable than nonaversive racists. They also responded with a marked reduction in prejudicial behavior in a subsequent discrimination task.

In the absence of good reasons to discriminate, dominant people exercise scrupulous censorship over their discriminatory responses and try their best to suppress their derogatory beliefs (Monteith, Sherman, & Devine, 1998). Suppression may be practiced to such an extent among some low-prejudiced people (Devine, 1989; Lepore & Brown, 1997; Monteith, Spicer, & Tooman, 1998) or people with chronic egalitarian goals (Moskowitz et al., 1999) that it becomes efficient and even automatized. Still, for other people, attempts at suppression are not always successful (Bodenhausen & Macrae, 1998). This means that suppression may have paradoxical rebound effects and even increase prejudice (Gordijn, Hindriks, Koomen, Dijksterhuis, & van Knippenberg, 2004; Macrae, Bodenhausen, Milne, & Jetten, 1994).

A key preoccupation among majority members is thus the control and suppression of prejudice. To tap this

motivation, researchers developed several individual difference measures. According to Plant and Devine (1998, 2001), the desire to respond without prejudice may come from two sources. When stemming from internal sources, prejudice is deemed wrong because it conflicts with a personal belief system. In contrast, prejudice may also be restricted as a result of social pressure. The role of such normative responses should not be downplayed because, in due time, individuals accommodate to social norms (Crandall et al., 2002). Provided the environment is tailored to minimize or even proscribe stigmatizing reactions, people will likely develop an internal motivation to control prejudice. The more an individual has come to internalize the egalitarian norm, the lower the expressed prejudice will be, even on implicit measures (Amodio, Harmon-Jones & Devine, 2003; Devine, Plant, Amodio, Harmon-Jones, & Vance, 2002). The added value of Plant and Devine's (2001) distinction resides in the fact that violations against internal motivation should result in feelings of guilt about one's conduct, whereas failure in the case of external motivation should bring about reactions of anger and threat regarding other people's reactions.

A somewhat different perspective, suggested by Dunton and Fazio (1997), combines internal and external motivation to control prejudice into a general concern with acting prejudiced. This concern finds its roots in a pro-egalitarian upbringing and positive experiences with stigmatized people. Dunton and Fazio also point to people's restraint to avoid disputes that stem from a prejudiced background and negative experiences with stigmatized members, which involves staying away from trouble and arguments with targets of the prejudice. They use Higgins's (1998) basic psychological distinction in regulatory focus between nurturance needs and ideals, on the one hand, and security needs and oughts, on the other hand, and postulate that the concern with acting prejudiced could, indeed, be reformulated in terms of a promotion focus, whereas the restraint to avoid dispute can best be reframed in terms of a prevention focus.

Finally, even though prejudiced people such as aversive racists would seem to be in control of their behavior and act in a nonprejudiced manner, a sizeable share of their responses to the situation are less controllable than they would want, allowing prejudice to "leak out." Dovidio and colleagues (Dovidio, Kawakami, & Gaertner, 2002; Dovidio, Kawakami, Johnson, Johnson, & Howard, 1997) found evidence for such dissociation, and thus a mix of cues disconfirming and confirming prejudice, when they asked their White participants to meet with Black confederates. Whereas participants' explicit prejudice was correlated with the friendliness of what they said (a controlled behavior), their implicit prejudice was linked to the friendliness of their

nonverbal actions (an automatic behavior). In general, situations in which behavioral control is more difficult, such as when norms remain unclear or when the measures are unobtrusive, may facilitate the materialization of prejudice. Recent research also confirms that the suppression of prejudice requires cognitive resources (Richeson & Shelton, 2003; Richeson & Trawalter, 2005), and factors that undermine people's mental energy allow prejudice to be expressed in behavior.

Organizational, Institutional, and Cultural Discriminatory Behaviors

Bias percolates throughout all layers of society. In particular, the way companies and institutions are organized may also result in unequal treatment even though it is difficult, if not impossible, to pinpoint the prejudice of a specific individual as the culprit. Illustrating the malicious nature of "established" discrimination, Topolski, Boyd-Bowman, and Ferguson (2003) had their participants blindly judge fruits that had been bought in low-, middle-, or upper-class neighborhoods. These authors found a significant relation between socioeconomic status (SES) and the taste and appearance of the fruits, suggesting that low SES people were likely to consume lower-quality food than people of higher SES. On a related note, Oldmeadow and Fiske's study (2007) found that people judged the occupants of cheap houses to be less competent than the occupants of expensive houses, an effect that was also exaggerated by SDO and beliefs in a just world. Findings such as these underscore the fact that members of stigmatized groups may be at a disadvantage in ways that go unacknowledged by most of the population.

Many groups continue to be overrepresented or underrepresented in various professions or at various hierarchical levels of the same profession. Beyond race and ethnicity, sex and age are two important categories that seem to play a role in the way societal forces channel people's fate. Recent years have witnessed increased consideration for discrimination based on additional characteristics such as disability, religion or belief, sexual orientation, among others. What is striking is that even small biases in practices, rules, and policies at each step of a person's path through life can accumulate and end up in dramatic inequalities in various societal spheres (Martell, Lane, & Emrich, 1996). Clearly, stereotypes and prejudice play a major role in raising, schooling, and orienting individuals, but also in hiring, promoting, and dismissing them in the workplace, and even in arresting, prosecuting, and sentencing them.

For instance, women comprise 59% of university graduates in the European Union (EU) but continue to be largely underrepresented in engineering and science or technology. As a result, only 29% of scientists and engineers in the EU are women. Figures from the workforce in 2002

in the United States (U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission [EEOC], 2004) reveal that, taking into account the respective numbers of White men and Black women in the workforce, the former are almost four times more likely than the latter to occupy managerial jobs. In Europe, the pay gap between women and men observed in 2006 remains steady at 15% since 2003, narrowing only one percentage point since 2000 (Commission of the European Communities [COM 10], 2008). Even when strong measures are in place to minimize the impact of preconceptions, more subtle features may orient decisions in an unfair direction (Ko, Muller, Judd, & Stapel, 2008). Analyzing a random sample of records of Black and White inmates, Blair, Judd, and Chapleau (2004; Blair, Chapleau, & Judd, 2005; Eberhardt, Davies, Purdie-Vaughns, & Johnson, 2006) found that they had been given roughly equivalent sentencing given equivalent criminal history. Still, inmates with more (vs. less) Afrocentric features received harsher (vs. lighter) sentences, revealing that judges bias their decision by relying on facial features of the offender (see also Maddox, 2004; Pager, 2003; Pager & Quillian, 2005).

There is a growing realization that concrete and large-scale organizational and institutional steps must be taken to challenge the subtle intrusion of bias and discrimination in different spheres of life (Goldin & Rouse, 2000; see Dovidio & Gaertner, this volume). As a case in point, certain European countries have enforced parity in the lists of candidates during elections, permitting the proportion of women to increase significantly in city, regional, and national political bodies. As of September 2009, the average number of female members of national parliaments has now attained more than 35% in Belgium, Spain, and Denmark, and even more than 40% in the Netherlands, Finland, and Sweden (at the same time, the figure reached some 17% in the U.S.A.). In line with the perspective underlying social-psychological research since Lewin (1948), discrimination needs to be combated on a daily basis by capitalizing on both individual and structural factors.

Summary

Bias and partiality come in many guises, and members of dominant groups manifest a host of discriminatory behaviors that contribute to their advantaged status. Although blatant discriminatory acts continue to be perpetrated, the unequal and unfair treatment of members of stigmatized and dominated groups usually rests on more subtle behaviors. Such "hidden" unfairness generally comes about when people think that their behavior is normative or positive, at least in appearance. Members of privileged groups will lean toward discrimination when their behavior can be concealed behind a curtain of ambiguity or respectability,

or both. Even if most people are motivated to appear tolerant and unbiased, suppressing prejudiced reactions is resource demanding unless it is practiced to the point that it becomes integrated and automatized. As a result, members of dominant groups often send out signals of prejudice via aspects of their conduct that are more difficult to control. Beyond individual actions, discrimination is also constitutive of the explicit and implicit routines that govern people's everyday interactions, whether in the workplace or in public settings.

Reactions of Dominated Groups

People generally experience anxiety at the prospect of an intergroup interaction. According to the intergroup anxiety model presented earlier (Stephan & Stephan, 1985), this anxiety derives, in part, from the negative expectations people develop concerning the possible reactions of outgroup members in the intergroup situation (Shelton & Richeson, 2005; Vorauer, 2006). Quite simply, individuals who belong to disadvantaged groups fear the potential prejudice and discrimination that they might experience during intergroup interactions (Branscombe et al., 1999; Tropp, 2003). Because a confrontation with a negative identity associated with the self may end up damaging self-esteem, the reaction of members of dominated groups to the anticipation of intergroup interaction is generally one of avoidance. But intergroup interaction can simply not be avoided at all times and in all circumstances. Two types of reactions are worth examining. On the one hand, dominated and low-status group members develop reactions to the various forms of behaviors that dominant, high-status outgroups display or are expected to display toward them. On the other hand, members of disadvantaged groups also react to their low-status stigmatized position in society independently of the actions undertaken by outgroup members. The two subsections that follow examine both responses in turn while restricting the discussion to those reactions that maintain rather than challenge the status quo in society.

Reactions Toward Behaviors of Dominant Group Members

Given the large disparity in behaviors of members of dominant groups examined earlier, it is reasonable to assume that members of the dominated group may show an assortment of differentiated reactions to discriminatory behaviors depending on whether these behaviors are explicitly or more subtly derogatory. Starting off with the worst case, victims of hate crimes experience heightened levels of anxiety, distress, anger, distrust, and fear in comparison with victims of similar crimes that were not motivated by social

discrimination. They also report more difficulties in coping with the effects of victimization and greater cognitive troubles such as intrusive thoughts, problems at work, and problems with concentration (Ehrlich, Larcom, & Purvis, 1995; McDevitt, Balboni, Garcia, & Gu, 2001). Research also shows that hate crimes impact not only the victims but also members of the victim's group (i.e., secondary victimization; McDevitt, et al., 2001).

Not all forms of prejudice are as blatant as hate crimes. More often than not, dominated group members actually face a problem of uncertainty concerning the behaviors displayed by members of a dominant group. This is especially the case for members of groups who suffer from visible rather than invisible stigma (e.g., in terms of race, sex, and so forth; Goffman, 1963; Jones et al., 1984). Indeed, empirical evidence confirms that targets of discrimination are especially sensitive to cues that indicate prejudice and are more likely than dominant group members to attribute ambiguously racist behaviors to the actor's prejudiced attitudes toward them. That is, they find it difficult to interpret a particular behavior and to assess the extent to which that behavior should be attributed to discrimination, or whether other situational or personal variables are at play. Crocker, Voelkl, Testa, and Major (1991) refer to this difficulty in terms of *attributional ambiguity*. Research in this domain investigates how stigmatized people (e.g., ethnic minorities, overweight women) react to positive or negative feedback given by outgroup members about their performance (Major & O'Brien, 2005). Apparently, members of stigmatized groups weigh both positive and negative feedback differently as a function of whether they attribute this information to prejudice against them. Indeed, stigmatized group members who suspect that the negative feedback they receive is based on factors other than their performance and ability tend to discount it (i.e., attribute it to prejudice). This discounting process has important self-protective implications for the psychological well-being of the targets of such discrimination. For instance, Crocker, and colleagues (1991) demonstrated that Blacks who could attribute feedback to prejudice were less depressed than those who could not make such attribution (Crocker & Major, 1989; Major & Crocker, 1993; see also Crocker, Major, & Steele, 1998). Similarly, when White and Black participants had to face an outgroup evaluator, social acceptance (i.e., positive feedback) produced cardiovascular reactivity consistent with challenge states and, indeed, better performance among White but not among Black people (Mendes, Major, McCoy, & Blascovich, 2008; see also Major, Kaiser, & McCoy, 2003). Conversely, stigmatized group members' propensity to discount positive feedback has undermining consequences for their self-esteem (Hoyt, Aguilar, Kaiser, Blascovich, & Lee, 2007). Despite

the attractiveness of the discounting hypothesis, empirical support for its claims remains open to question, and the effects on well-being have been qualified by a series of specific factors (e.g., Crocker, Cornwell, & Major, 1993; McCoy & Major, 2003; Mendoza-Denton, Downey, Purdie, & Davis, 2002).

Calling into question the discounting hypothesis that Crocker and Major (1989) proposed, Branscombe, Schmitt, and colleagues (e.g., Branscombe et al., 1999) reasoned that, although attributions to discrimination might be self-protective when people face unstable instances of prejudice, widespread bias against one's social group will, in the long run, trigger negative consequences for the well-being of targets of such discrimination. According to these authors, attribution of failure to discrimination may be damaging for one's self-esteem for at least two reasons. First, the recognition of widespread discrimination is a constant reminder of one's inability to lead and control one's own life (Schmitt & Branscombe, 2002a). Second, attribution to discrimination may call into question unmistakable internal factors linked to one's social identity (Schmitt & Branscombe, 2002b). As a consequence, members of discriminated groups should tend to minimize rather than maximize the importance of discrimination in their lives. Branscombe, Schmitt, and Harvey (1999) developed the *rejection-identification model* to account for the fact that members of stigmatized groups do not seem to suffer from huge losses in self-esteem. They proposed that identification with one's social ingroup acts as a buffer between discrimination and self-esteem. That is, although perceiving discrimination negatively impacts self-esteem, discriminated people react against discrimination by increasing their feelings of identification with the ingroup, with beneficial consequences for their self-esteem (Ellemers, Wilke, & van Knippenberg, 1993). Support for the rejection-identification model is solid and emerges for very different social groups (e.g., African Americans: Branscombe et al., 1999; women: Redersdorff, Martinot, & Branscombe, 2004; the elderly: Garstka, Schmitt, Branscombe, & Hummert, 2004).

Encounters with discrimination do not necessarily translate into awareness of disadvantage. In fact, the literature on the personal-group discrimination discrepancy (Crosby, 1982; Taylor, Wright, & Porter, 1994) has shown that people usually perceive themselves to be less discriminated against than members of their ingroup. Similarly, discriminated people perceive the world to be more just for nondiscriminated people and for themselves than for members of their ingroup (Sutton, Douglas, Wilkin, Elder, Cole, & Stathi, 2008). Several explanations, both motivational (Crosby, Clayton, Alksnis, & Hemker, 1986; Kaiser & Miller, 2001; Taylor et al., 1994) and cognitive (Crosby

et al., 1986; Fuegen & Biernat, 2000; Taylor et al., 1994) in tone, account for these findings. For instance, Dupont and Leyens (2003) suggested that individuals deny or minimize personal instances of discrimination to maintain positive illusions about themselves and a sense of control over events.

Because personal and group discrimination may differentially relate to self-esteem and group identification, Bourguignon, Seron, Yzerbyt, and Herman (2006) proposed refining the rejection-identification model, taking into account the difference between perceptions of personal and group discrimination. These authors replicated Branscombe and colleagues' model (1999) for personal discrimination, but they also found that group and personal discrimination showed opposite relations with self-esteem. The more participants experienced self-discrimination, the lower was their self-esteem. In sharp contrast, the more participants perceived their group to be discriminated against, the higher was their self-esteem. Bourguignon and colleagues proposed that perceiving group discrimination together with the perception that one occupies an acceptable (less discriminated) position would raise self-esteem through a positive contrast with other members of the ingroup (Mussweiler, 2003).

Patronizing behaviors (i.e., treating others in a condescending manner) constitute yet another form of discriminatory behavior that members of dominated groups have to face. In a series of studies, Vescio, Gervais, Snyder, and Hoover (2005) looked at the impact of patronizing behaviors of a powerful person on both dominant (i.e., male) and dominated (i.e., female) targets. In one experiment, patronizing was operationalized by having the powerful person praise the target while at the same time assigning the target to a devalued position. Results revealed that both male and female individuals experienced anger as a result of the unfair treatment, but only men's performance increased in a subsequent allegedly masculine task, whereas female performance did not differ from a control condition. Apparently, men considered subsequent performance as a way to fight against the injustice and to decrease their experienced anger. Presumably, female individuals had a different reaction because they did not perceive their performance in a masculine task as an action that could effectively alter the situation (Harmon-Jones, Sigelman, Bohlig, & Harmon-Jones, 2003).

Thus, complimenting a target is obviously not sufficient to counter the negative effects of simultaneous discrimination on subsequent performance. Perhaps complimenting, in the absence of explicit devaluation, could produce more favorable outcomes for dominated group members. Dardenne, Dumont, and Bollier (2007) tested the effects of hostile and benevolent sexism (Glick & Fiske, 1996, 2001c) on female performance. In four studies, they used a job selection context in which the position required typically female characteristics. Independently of whether expressions of benevolent sexism were accompanied by references to unsolicited help or the mention of a preferential selection of female over male individuals, benevolent sexism led to poorer performance by women than did expressions of hostile sexism. Dardenne and colleagues showed that, because benevolent sexism is less easily identified as sexism than hostile sexism (and is, therefore, more ambiguous), it leads to more mental intrusions and self-doubt, which, in turn, decrease capacity and worsen performance (Dumont, Sarlet, & Dardenne, 2008).

The detrimental effects of the expression of positive stereotypes on performance are also accompanied by the target's negative reactions to such compliments. Although majority group members often fail to recognize the inappropriateness of positive stereotypes (Czopp & Monteith, 2006; Devine & Elliot, 1995; Mae & Carlston, 2005) and consequently do not correct for their influence on social judgments (Lambert, Khan, Lickel, & Fricke, 1997), dominated group members often resent the expression of positive stereotypes and evaluate the commentator less positively than when no such comments are made (Czopp, 2008).

Reactions About Their Disadvantaged Position

Members of dominated groups face specific discriminating episodes or chronic discrimination, but they also have to cope with their real or alleged disadvantaged position in the social ladder. A first aspect has to do with the impact of negative stereotypical expectations. The concern here is not so much for the consequences of an interaction with any specific prejudiced person, but for what Steele (1997) called the "threat in the air"—that is, the unfavorable stereotypes that are widely available in society about one or another group. Members of minority groups are often keenly aware of their presumed limitations in competence-related domains. For instance, women are thought to be less apt at math (Shih, Pittinsky, & Ambady, 1999; Spencer, Steele, & Quinn, 1999) and the same holds for Latinos and particularly Latinas (Gonzales, Blanton, & Williams, 2002). Stereotypes also hold that African Americans perform worse than European Americans on standardized intelligence tests (Steele & Aronson, 1995), that older people suffer from memory deficits (Chasteen, Bhattacharyya, Horhota, Tam, & Hasher, 2005), that people with low incomes perform more poorly than people with high income on linguistic tasks (Croizet & Claire, 1998), and that psychology students are less competent than their science colleagues (Croizet, Després, Gauzins, Huguet, Leyens, & Méot, 2004). Even members of groups who typically enjoy advantaged social status may at times be confronted with a negative stereotype on a particular dimension. For example, men are believed to

face limitations in emotional sensitivity (Koenig & Eagly, 2005; Leyens, Désert, Croizet, & Darcis, 2000), Whites are perceived as worse than Blacks in athletic ability (Stone, Lynch, Sjomeling, & Darley, 1999), and Whites are perceived as worse in math than Asians (Aronson, Lustina, Keough, Brown, & Steele, 1999). Notably, shortcomings in the social, as opposed to the competence, domain are more readily associated with members of the dominant group, whereas the reverse appears to be true for dominated group members. This particular combination is reminiscent of the work on the two fundamental dimensions of social judgment, warmth and competence (Fiske, Cuddy, Glick, & Xu, 2002), and more particularly on the compensation phenomenon that suggests that people often evaluate groups in a compensatory manner such that what one group gains in terms of competence, it loses in terms of sociability, and vice versa (Judd et al., 2005; Yzerbyt et al., 2005, 2008).

The consequences of negative social reputations have been the focus of intensive research since the late 1990s (Schmader, Johns, & Forbes, 2008; Shapiro & Neuberg, 2007; Steele, 1997; Steele & Aronson, 1995; Steele, Spencer, & Aronson, 2002). Whether the bad reputation of a group in a particular area is or is not justified, performance tests pose a serious threat for group members. Failure not only constitutes a humiliating personal experience, it also carries with it the embarrassment of having validated unflattering preconceptions about the group as a whole. Schmader and colleagues (2008) recently proposed that stereotype threat rests on the activation of three unit relations (Heider, 1958): a positive relation between the concept of a group (e.g., women) and the self-concept (i.e., implying that the group is perceived as an ingroup), a positive relation between the concept of a domain (e.g., math) and the self-concept, and a negative relation between the concept of a group and the concept of a domain (e.g., women are not good in math and this is a diagnostic math test). Any of these three relations can be more or less prevalent as a function of individual differences and contextual factors. For instance, group identification (Schmader, 2002) or solo status (Inzlicht & Ben-Zeev, 2000; Sekaquaptewa & Thompson, 2003) may influence the salience of an individual's group membership (Marx, Stapel, & Muller, 2005). Building on the flexibility of social identity, Shih, Pittinsky, and Ambady (1999) illustrated the role of contextual factors by priming Asian women either with their gender identity, leading to a decrement in performance, or with their racial identity, causing an increase in performance. Clearly, it is the imbalance of the links between the three concepts that constitutes a menace for self-integrity, that is, the sense that one is a valuable and coherent individual (Steele, 1988).

Targets of negative stereotypes are generally motivated to try to disconfirm the group's negative reputation and do

their best to prevent failure, but provided the task is complex and demanding enough (Spencer et al., 1999), this creates a sort of extra burden that interferes with the successful completion of the task. As far as the mechanisms by which stereotype threat undermines performance, stereotype threat triggers a disheartening combination of motivational and cognitive phenomena, all contributing to a decrement in performance. According to Schmader and colleagues (2008), physiological stress responses (Blascovich, Spencer, Quinn, & Steele, 2001; Croizet et al., 2004; O'Brien & Crandall, 2003), together with the monitoring of the situational cues, likely generate a host of negative thoughts (Cadinu, Maass, Rosabianca, & Kiesner, 2005; Marx & Stapel, 2006; Stangor, Carr, & Kiang, 1998) and negative feelings (Keller & Dauenheimer, 2003) that people try to suppress, with limited success (Steele et al., 2002; but see McGlone & Aronson, 2007). As a set, these factors disrupt people's working memory, resulting in a performance deficit (Schmader & Johns, 2003).

Research suggests a number of remedies to counter the detrimental impact of negative stereotypes. In one way or another, they confirm the view of stereotype threat as involving three unit relations. For instance, one can stress the fairness of the test and its insensitivity to group differences. Sticking to the link between the domain and the group, it is also possible to emphasize other strengths of the ingroup (Marx, Stapel, & Muller, 2005). Alternatively, one can affirm a unique attribute of the self (Martens, Johns, Greenberg, & Schimel, 2006) or minimize the link between the self and the cultural stereotype of the ingroup, a strategy called "identity bifurcation" (Pronin, Steele, & Ross, 2004). These efforts are important because stereotype threat is not simply a laboratory curiosity. It has dramatic real-life consequences that can be reduced if appropriate action is taken (Cohen, Garcia, Apfel, & Master, 2006). Clearly, psychological disengagement, that is, the detachment of one's self-esteem from a specific domain, is not inevitable (Crocker et al., 1998; Major, Spencer, Schmader, Wolfe, & Crocker, 1998). Disengagement creates disidentification in that people devalue a particular domain and de-emphasize the importance of success in this area (Schmader, Major, & Gramzow, 2001). These processes bear strong resemblance to social creativity, a reaction to which we alluded earlier and which is frequently observed among members of low-status groups.

As it happens, responses of minority group members to their disadvantaged position highly depend on their level of identification, as well as their perception of the intergroup structure. According to SIT (Tajfel & Turner, 1979), to the extent that the structure is perceived as illegitimate and unstable, disadvantaged group members come to form alternatives to the existing intergroup structure and are willing

to engage in collective action aimed at social change (see Dovidio & Gaertner, this volume). However, as stressed by Taylor and colleagues (Taylor & McKirnan, 1984; Wright, Taylor, & Moghaddam, 1990), individual upward mobility is usually the default. Even a small number of tokens that are allowed to gain access to the advantaged group may undermine collective action (Wright et al., 1990). Examining the pursuit of individual mobility strategies, Ellemers, Spears, and Doosje (1997) found that people who primarily perceive themselves as individuals instead of group members (i.e., low identifiers) try to minimize their association with their group and to gain access to the more advantaged outgroup.

People are often reluctant to acknowledge group-based discrimination (Schmitt & Branscombe, 2002a) and do not feel good when reminded that their membership in a particular group makes it more difficult for them to achieve favorable individual products (Branscombe, 1998). In other words, people do not like to think that their outcomes may be shaped by their group membership instead of reflecting their individual worth (Major et al., 2002; Major & Schmader, 2001). In contrast, they want to believe that they possess sufficient control to overcome difficulties and to improve their social standing through merit and adequate performance (Bobo & Hutchings, 1996; Kluegal & Smith, 1986). Beliefs in meritocracy tend to increase perceived legitimacy of the system as a whole and to reinforce the status quo between social groups (Ellemers, 1993, 2001; Wright, 2001).

Given the importance of meritocracy beliefs, it is most interesting to consider the reactions of minority members who managed to climb the social ladder (Ellemers & Barreto, 2009; Ellemers, van den Heuvel, de Gilder, Maass, & Bonvini, 2004). Usually, not all individuals of a disadvantaged group necessarily suffer from inequality and a limited number of token minority members have gained access to advantaged positions. The question then is how these upwardly mobile individuals perceived themselves as representative of their disadvantaged ingroup. In particular, do successful individuals want to help change the negative stereotypes usually associated with their ingroup? Do they facilitate social change and the advancement of other ingroup members? Research suggests that the answers to these questions might well be negative. As a matter of fact, to achieve success and individual mobility, members of disadvantaged groups must emphasize the extent to which they differ from, rather than resemble, members of their own group. This makes it unlikely, first, for their ability to achieve success to be generalized to other members of their ingroup and, second, for they themselves to identify with other members of their disadvantaged group. Research by Wright and colleagues (Wright, 2001; Wright & Taylor,

1999) supports the idea that successful token members of disadvantaged groups tend to quickly shift their identity from the disadvantaged to the advantaged group and, as a consequence, are reluctant to support actions that would challenge the unjustified status quo. They thus legitimize rather than oppose existing intergroup status differences. Similarly, empirical evidence supporting the same claim is advanced by Ellemers and colleagues' work on sex differences (Ellemers, 1993, 2001; Ellemers & Barreto, 2009; Ellemers, van den Heuvel, et al., 2004). These authors have shown that successful professional women perceive themselves as exceptional individuals, describe themselves in more masculine terms than their male colleagues, and portray other women in a sex-stereotypical fashion. This tendency for successful women to distance themselves from other women indirectly contributes to the persistence of sex discrimination in Western societies.

Summary

Reactions to discriminatory behaviors depend on the form of the discrimination. The more overt the discrimination, the more members of dominated groups will experience anxiety, distrust, fear, anger, and the like. However, discrimination behaviors are rarely blatant, which means that members of stigmatized groups face a problem of attributional ambiguity. If the interpretation is in terms of discrimination, negative consequences ensue, mostly on the target's self-esteem and well-being. Even seemingly positive behaviors can lead to ironic negative consequences for the performance of these individuals. Members of subordinate groups not only react to specific acts but more generally to their disadvantaged position in society. Their knowledge of a negative stereotype attached to their group produces a threat, and motivates them to try and disconfirm the expectation. Ironically, this increased motivation produces a decrement in performance and leads to psychological disengagement and disidentification with the domain. Whether stigmatized group members opt for individual or collective strategies to overcome their disadvantage depends on their identification and their perception of the structural constraints in society. In addition, those individuals who managed to climb up the social ladder may well reinforce rather than modify the status quo.

Intergroup Interactions

To truly get a sense of what intergroup relations signify, one needs to study, investigate, and scrutinize real interactions between members of different social groups (Demoulin et al., 2009). Why is the study of intergroup interactions so crucial for the understanding of intergroup processes? The first obvious answer is that actions do not occur in a vacuum.

Individuals are influenced by a series of situational factors that shape the course of the interaction. The topic of discussion between the interactants (Saguy, Pratto, Dovidio, & Nadler, 2009; Trawalter & Richeson, 2008) and the evaluative potential of the situation (e.g., public vs. private) are variables likely to greatly influence the nature of intergroup interactions. Pearson and colleagues' study (2008) revealed, for instance, that external temporal disruptions in the discussion between interacting partners increased (vs. reduced) reports of anxiety in intergroup (vs. intragroup) dyads.

Second, aside from these contextual factors, antecedents of intergroup interactions also play a role in determining the shape of intergroup processes. It is commonly accepted that people hold more negative expectations regarding intergroup than intragroup interactions (Stephan & Stephan, 1985), and that these intergroup negative expectations are not always accurate. That is, intergroup interactions are usually more positive than people expect them to be. Mallett, Wilson, and Gilbert (2008) argued that this intergroup forecasting error is, in part, due to people's tendencies to focus on their dissimilarities (rather than similarities) with outgroup members. In one illustrative experiment, two White participants were assigned to the same Black interaction partner. One of the White participants (the forecaster) was removed from the room and asked to imagine what it would be like to talk with the Black participant. Measures of partner liking and perceived similarity were recorded. The other White person (the experiencer) entered into an interaction with the Black partner before answering the same questionnaire about the positivity of the interaction and perceived similarity with the partner. Results revealed that forecasters imagined the interaction with the Black partner to be less positive than the actual experience of experiencers. In addition, forecasters evaluated themselves as less similar to the Black partner than experiencers did, and these similarity evaluations mediated the relation between the type of person (forecaster vs. experiencer) and the partner evaluations. In summary, forecasters erred in believing that they would not be similar to the Black partner, and it is precisely this perceived dissimilarity that drove them to assume that the intergroup interaction would turn out to be negative (Wilson & Gilbert, 2008).

Other elements that influence one's own as well as the other person's behavior are concerned with expectancies about the partner's beliefs, attitudes, and behaviors. For example, Johnson and Lecci (2003) found that targets of discrimination generally hold expectations that their interactions with majority group members will include prejudice. Importantly, the extent to which a Black person expected a White interaction partner to be prejudiced (whether because of chronic or induced prejudice expectations) influenced

the experience they had in an interethnic interaction, with more negative experiences in prejudice expectation contexts (Shelton, Richeson, & Salvatore, 2005). The large literature on the self-fulfilling prophecy also reveals the powerful impact of a person's expectancies on behavioral confirmation (Klein & Snyder, 2003). Negative expectancies also lead to perceptual bias during the interaction. In Kleck and Strenta's (1980) classic experiment, individuals were led to believe that they were physically deviant (i.e., in the form of a facial disfigurement) in the eyes of an interactant. Although the interactant, in fact, never perceived the negative attribute, participants perceived strong negative reactivity to the facial stigma in the behavior of the interactant. Kleck and Strenta suggest that a perceptual bias was responsible for these findings, in that only the persons who thought that one member of the dyad had a facial disfigurement were prone to interpret eye gaze behavior from the part of the interactant as reaction to the supposed physical defect. Similarly, Inzlicht, Kaiser, and Major (2008) found that prejudice expectations affected the interpretation of emotional display of male individuals by female participants. Obviously, perceptual biases, as well as behavioral and cognitive biases that are at the heart of intergroup interactions (see also, Mendes, Blascovich, Hunter, Lickel, & Jost, 2002), will cause potentially dramatic misunderstandings and miscomprehensions between members of different groups. We return to the intergroup misunderstanding issue later in this chapter.

A third reason for studying intergroup processes in real interactions relates to the consequences of such intergroup interactions. By concentrating research efforts on one side only, researchers might not account for the full spectrum of outcomes that each specific behavior entails. In short, it is crucial to examine intergroup encounters in their entire complexity to grasp the potential causes for misunderstanding (Demoulin, Leyens, & Dovidio, 2009).

On several occasions, this chapter called attention to the fact that intergroup interactions are emotionally arousing for members of both minority and majority groups because evaluative pressures in these contexts are typically greater than in interpersonal (intragroup) interactions (Crandall & Eshleman, 2003; Richeson & Shelton, 2007; Stephan & Stephan, 1985; Vorauer & Kumhyr, 2001). The stress provoked by intergroup contact has a number of consequences for individuals. For instance, Richeson and colleagues (2005) found that intergroup (vs. intragroup) encounters between Whites and Blacks undermined subsequent executive control on a race-irrelevant Stroop color-naming task, confirming that interracial interactions can be cognitively costly. This suggests that, to cope with stressful situations and successfully negotiate intergroup interactions, individuals of all groups usually rely on self-regulation strategies.

As for the members of majority and dominant groups, self-regulation strategies often turn around prejudice reduction and vigilance for or suppression of discriminatory behaviors. Building on Higgins's (1998) regulatory focus theory, Trawalter and Richeson (2006) proposed that the goal of not appearing prejudiced could be pursued with either a prevention or a promotion focus. Prevention focus was manipulated by encouraging individuals to "avoid prejudice" during the interracial interaction, whereas promotion focus was encouraged by motivating individuals to achieve a "positive intercultural exchange." Prevention-focused individuals were found to perform worse on the subsequent Stroop task than promotion-focused individuals. In addition, prevention led to similar levels of cognitive depletion than those found among control individuals. These results are consistent with findings reported by Leyens, Demoulin, Désert, Vaes, and Philippot (2002), who found that when participants are instructed to be color-blind (i.e., not to make reference to intergroup differences), they were more anxious and less capable of expressing emotions to an outgroup target than when instructed to act in a color-conscious fashion (i.e., to act as a function of intergroup differences). These findings also relate to the work on color blindness and multiculturalism that shows that, overall, multiculturalism generates less explicit and implicit racial bias than color blindness (Richeson & Nussbaum, 2004; Wolsko, Park, Judd, & Wittenbrink, 2000).

Because members of dominant or dominated groups do not face the exact same types of threats in intergroup situations, the strategies they use to regulate their behaviors may differ. As suggested earlier, White majority group members are particularly concerned with appearing prejudiced in the interaction, and deploy strategies of vigilance, suppression, and effortful self-presentation to avoid appearing to behave in prejudiced ways (Richeson & Trawalter, 2008; Shelton, Richeson, Salvatore, & Trawalter, 2005). In contrast, Black minority group members who especially fear being the target of prejudice self-regulate by engaging in compensatory strategies in the sense that they display enhanced engagement and self-disclosure in the interaction as compared with racial minorities who do not expect to be prejudiced against (Shelton, Richeson, & Salvatore, 2005).

A unilateral perspective on these results would then conclude for a negative effect of intergroup interactions in the case of White majorities with high interracial concerns and an opposite positive effect in the case of Black minorities. But if one looks somewhat deeper and simultaneously investigates interpersonal in addition to intrapersonal outcomes of self-regulatory processes, a different picture emerges. For instance, Shelton, Richeson, Salvatore, and Trawalter (2005) have shown that the efforts displayed by high-prejudice Whites to regulate their behaviors do not go unrecognized by their Black interaction partners who actually reward those behaviors by forming more favorable impressions of them compared with low-bias individuals (see Dovidio et al., 2002). Similarly, compensatory strategies utilized by ethnic minority group members to avoid being discriminated against, although positive at first sight, are accompanied by negative affective outcomes for them (Shelton, Richeson, & Salvatore, 2005).

The divergent impact of interracial contact on intrapersonal and interpersonal outcomes has been modeled by Richeson and Shelton (2007), who proposed that individual differences (e.g., racial attitudes, previous contact), as well as situational factors (e.g., goals, topic of discussion), moderate the activation of interracial affective reactions (e.g., intergroup anxiety) and concerns (e.g., appearing prejudiced, confirming stereotypes). Once activated, affective reactions and interracial concerns promote the use of self-regulatory strategies (e.g., vigilance, suppression, compensatory behaviors) that result in a host of both positive (e.g., partner liking) and negative (e.g., cognitive depletion, negative affect) intrapersonal and interpersonal outcomes. Although it still requires empirical validation, the model is useful in that it constitutes a roadmap for further investigation in the domain of intergroup interactions. However, it remains unclear whether what the model proposes for interracial interactions could be usefully transposed onto other types of intergroup interactions.

Summary

One cannot get a complete sense of intergroup relations simply by juxtaposing findings obtained from the behaviors of the dominated and dominant group members taken in isolation. This is because interactions are influenced by several additional factors, some having to do with features of the interaction itself, such as the goals underlying the interaction. Other important determinants concern the expectations that people bring with them to the interaction. More often than not, people rely on negative and caricatured views of their interaction partner. This may limit the opportunity for disconfirmation because people are reluctant to even enter the interaction. And when encounters take place, they have consequences that should be considered more closely. Oftentimes, people experience a series of misunderstandings.

CHALLENGES AND PROMISES

> Two trains passing in the night . . .
> —Jones, Engelman, Turner, & Campbell (2009, p. 131)

Intergroup relations research is not conducted the same way it used to in the 1980s. As a matter of fact, the field

has recently gone through a series of major modifications. This last section first reviews the various domains in which the field has made significant progress. These domains concern aspects of methods and techniques, issues of theory and conceptualization, as well as shifts in focus of interest. This section then concentrates on a series of future challenges that need to be addressed by our discipline.

As was evidenced in the introductory example about the 2008 U.S. presidential election and is now largely acknowledged in the field, the manner in which group members envisage their relations with members of other groups and the way intergroup interactions unfold have changed dramatically over the last century. In so-called egalitarian societies, overt and blatant discriminations of stigmatized social groups and minorities are no longer deemed acceptable. Rather, people are encouraged to treat all individuals in a fair manner and independently of the groups to which these individuals belong. This rather optimistic change in how one is supposed to go about intergroup relations is, however, tempered by two important considerations. First, antidiscrimination norms appear to apply more to some social targets than to others. That is, historical and cultural variables combine to determine which types of outgroups may benefit from egalitarian concerns and which outgroups will continue to suffer from continued bigotry and intolerance. Second, current theoretical propositions suggest that racism, sexism, and other "isms" have not, in fact, been suppressed but rather have changed in their form of expression by becoming less visible or less attributable to negative attitudes toward outgroup members. This evolution has given rise to the first major change in intergroup relation research that characterizes the late 1990s, that is, a profound modification in the research tools. Scholars now increasingly rely on sophisticated techniques that allow, for instance, for the measurement of reaction times or neural activity. As such, this emergence of new technologies has permitted researchers to investigate and test ideas and hypotheses that were simply unthinkable before.

Second, and as suggested throughout this chapter, recent theories of intergroup relations more systematically and more strictly rely on a tripartite view of human attitudes. Early on, researchers in social psychology were turning their attention to one of the three components at the expense of the other two. Even more problematic, they sometimes even failed to distinguish appraisals from feelings and feelings from behaviors, be it in their theoretical argument or in their empirical work. More recent theories of intergroup relations have revived the traditional tripartite perspective and now attempt to deal with more than one component at a time. That is, scholars try to include all three components of attitudes in their models, as well as in their experiments.

The third change that deserves to be stressed concerns researchers' focus of interest with respect to each of the three components just mentioned. After some 20 years of research on the cognitive component of attitudes, the beginning of the 21st century has witnessed growing interest in the power of emotions for the prediction of intergroup behaviors. In the previous edition of the *Handbook,* Brewer and Brown (1998) devoted a little less than three pages to what they called the "*emotional* consequences of classifying others as 'outgroups' (emphasis in original)." Emotions did pop up in a number of places in the chapter other than in the section on outgroup hostility and prejudice, most notably when talking about the importance of anxiety in the reduction of prejudice, but it is fair to say that the role afforded to feelings remained rather modest. Similarly, in Fiske's (1998) chapter on stereotypes, prejudice, and discrimination, three pages were explicitly dedicated to prejudice even though, again, a short discussion of early theories of prejudice included at the outset of the chapter should be added to this number. In contrast, a consideration for the role of feelings in the unfolding of relations between groups and group members does come across as a hallmark of the research conducted during since the late 1990s.

Another change in focus has to do with the specific vantage point that is adopted in research. For long, intergroup relations could be equated with the social psychology of the members of dominant groups. Researchers then enlarged the picture and took into consideration the social psychology of the members of subordinate groups. More recent work has begun to combine these two "partial" perspectives and now pays more attention to the dynamic processes that take place during intergroup contact (e.g., Richeson & Shelton, 2007).

A series of challenges also await future research. First, in keeping with what has just been said, it is important to pay more attention to reciprocal influence of both parties of the interaction. That is, members of subordinate and dominant groups do not appraise, feel, and act in a vacuum. Along the same lines, more efforts should be devoted to temporal aspects, that is, the way intergroup interactions unfold over time. This increased attention paid to the dynamics of intergroup interactions should certainly, in the decade to come, prove most useful in revealing new challenges for the study of intergroup relations. One fascinating item on researchers' agenda will be to understand disagreements and misunderstandings that emerge from a confrontation of groups with different viewpoints. As a matter of fact, people who occupy different positions in society are not identical. Members of dominant and dominated groups

often live in very different psychological worlds because of their divergent cultural and historical backgrounds, their different subjective experiences of the immediate social setting, as well as the specific goals they pursue and their unique coping strategies (Demoulin et al., 2009).

Second, there is little doubt that researchers in the domain of intergroup relations will be forced to extend their definition and conception of intergroup relations. With the advent of new technologies that allow people from all over the world to converse with one another on a daily basis and with the expansion of person mobility programs, intergroup interactions will no longer be restricted to forced physical encounters between the parties. That is, social psychology will have to explore the impact and antecedents of intergroup encounters that occur on a voluntary basis, and that encompass the sincere willingness to explore and appreciate intergroup and intercultural differences.

Finally, at the opposite end of the spectrum, more attention should be devoted to those intergroup encounters that involve intense levels of intergroup aggression and large-scale violent behaviors such as wars, genocides, and the like (Lickel, Miller, Stenstrom, Denson, & Schmader, 2006). What brings about extreme manifestations of intergroup hatred (Staub, 1989, 2006) and how to recover from such dramatic episodes as ethnic cleansing and attempts at physical eradication of entire groups are topics that attract the attention of a growing number of scholars (Brown & Cehajic, 2008; Gibson, 2004; Kanyangara et al., 2007). This kind of research is not only likely to enrich existing knowledge on intergroup contact (Dovidio & Gaertner, this volume), but it also holds the potential to suggest fascinating new questions (Nadler, Malloy, & Fisher, 2008).

The goal of this chapter was to present contemporary knowledge in intergroup relations research. The amount of research accumulated since the last edition of the *Handbook* is nothing short of enormous, demonstrating if it were needed the role and importance of intergroup relations in people's lives. This chapter starts by reviewing the literature investigating how individuals connect with groups. The second section examines the way people appraise groups, as well as the intergroup situation. The third section details the emotional reaction people experience as a function of their group membership and the various feelings that arise in intergroup situations. Finally, the fourth section examines the various behaviors that people engage in and by which they, willingly or not, maintain the existing intergroup situation. Clearly, the new challenges that present themselves for the field will no doubt allow social psychologists to conduct equally prolific research in the next decade. Growing attention for the cultural dimensions of intergroup relations, as well as their neuropsychological foundations, will attract new generations of researchers, delivering new dividends

in terms of knowledge. This promises to be a wonderful scientific journey.

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